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INTRODUCTION

While attending Wentworth Junior High School in Calumet
City, Illinois, Michael Lemke punctured his right hand with a
pencil.' Later the same day, St. Margaret Hospital in Hammond,
Indiana, admitted Michael. A staff doctor performed surgery to
remove the pencil from his hand.2 Two days after the surgery, St.
Margaret Hospital transferred Michael to a hospital in Chicago,
Illinois.' Four days after the accident, Michael died in Chicago.'
Betty Sue Lemke,5 Michael's mother, filed a medical malpractice action in Illinois state court against St. Margaret Hospital, the
staff doctor, and Wentworth Junior High School.6 Dr. Patel, the
staff doctor, filed a motion to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction.7 He argued that he was not subject to jurisdiction in Illinois because he was a citizen and resident of Indiana, he
was licensed to practice medicine only in Indiana, and the surgery
that gave rise to the lawsuit occurred in Indiana.' The plaintiff
argued that Dr. Patel was subject to jurisdiction in Illinois because
he regularly and continuously solicited and treated Illinois patients,
while receiving Illinois public and private funds for his services.9
In analyzing whether a forum may exercise personal jurisdiction, courts must consider. (1) whether the relevant long-arm stat-

'

See Lemke v. St. Margaret Hospital, 552 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. 111.1982).

. See id. at 835.
. See i.
See i.
x Both Michael and Betty Sue Lemke were residents of Illinois at the time of the
accident and at the time she filed suit. See id. at 835.
' See id. St. Margaret Hospital and Dr. Patel filed an uncontested petition to remove

the action to federal court. See id.
7. See id
& See id
9- See id. at 835-36.

,CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 48:559

ute confers jurisdiction; and (2) whether the exercise of jurisdiction
is permitted by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. For purposes of discussion, assume that the relevant
long-arm statute provides:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person,
who acts directly or by an agent ... causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state if
he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any
other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial
revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered,
in this state ...."
This provision would authorize jurisdiction over Dr. Patel. He
allegedly caused injury in the forum (Michael died in Chicago,
Illinois) by an act outside of the forum (Dr. Patel performed the
surgery in Indiana), and he regularly solicits business in Illinois.
However, does the Due Process Clause permit jurisdiction in
this case? The Supreme Court has recognized two types of personal
jurisdiction that are authorized by the Constitution: (1) general

'0.The Illinois long-arm statute does not contain a hybrid jurisdiction provision like
the one quoted in the text. See ILL. CoMP. STAT. § 110/2-209 (West 1985). The court in
the Lemke case upheld the exercise of jurisdiction on the ground that Dr. Patel was "doing business" in Illinois and thus could be subject to general jurisdiction.
"- UNIF. INTERSTATE AND INT'L PROCEDURE AcT § 1.03, 13 U.L.A. 361 (1962). The
following state statutes have long-arm provisions that are similar to the language quoted
in the text: ALASKA STAT. § 09.05.015(a)(4) (Michie 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
52-59b(3) (West 1991); D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423(a)(4) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
48.193(l)(f) (West 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91(3) (1982); IND. CODE ANN. §
4.4(A)(3) (West 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308(b)(7) (1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
454.210(2)(a)(4) & (5) (Banks-Baldwin 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3201(a)(4)
(West 1983); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 223A § 3(d) (West 1985); NEB. REV. STAT. §
25-536(I)(d) (1995); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3) (McKinney 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 175.4(4) (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382(A)(4)-(5) (Anderson 1995); OR. REV.
STAT. § 43(D) (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803(I)(d) (Law Co-op. 1996); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-328.1(A)(4)-(5) (Michie 1992); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 4903(4) (1996); W.
VA. CODE § 56-3-33(a)(4)-(5) (1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.05(4) (West 1994).
Two states have adopted long-arm provisions that extend jurisdiction to any defendant who:
Causes tortious injury in the State or outside of the State by an act or omission outside the State if the person regularly does or solicits business, engages
in any other persistent course of conduct in the State or derives substantial
revenue from services or things used or consumed in the State.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3104(c)(4) (1996); see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 6-103(b)(4) (1997). These provisions are significantly broader than the uniform
statute because they are not limited to injuries occurring within the forum state.
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jurisdiction, which confers jurisdiction over a defendant for any
cause of action if the defendant has substantial and continuous
contacts with the forum; and (2) specific jurisdiction, which confers
jurisdiction over a defendant for causes of action that arise out of
the defendant's contacts with the forum. Although the facts of the
Lemke case satisfy the long-arm provision quoted above, neither
general nor specific jurisdiction is independently satisfied in the
Lemke case. 2 Rather, the long-arm provision appears to combine
the requirements of general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction
without satisfying either type of jurisdiction completely. This Article refers to this type of jurisdiction as "hybrid jurisdiction."
This Article will analyze the constitutionality of hybrid jurisdiction. First, the Article describes the distinction between specific and
general jurisdiction and concludes that while many factual scenarios
fall neatly into one category or the other, a significant group of
cases exhibit characteristics of both types of jurisdiction without
completely satisfying either. Next, the Article considers the constitutional requirements for general jurisdiction and determines that
hybrid jurisdiction does not satisfy these requirements. The Article
then analyzes the constitutional requirements for specific jurisdiction. The Article suggests that although hybrid jurisdiction does not
satisfy the traditional test for specific jurisdiction requiring a claim
to "arise out of" the defendant's purposeful contacts with the forum, some instances of hybrid jurisdiction may satisfy the underlying goals of specific jurisdiction and thus be constitutional. Finally,
the Article proposes a framework for analyzing whether hybrid
jurisdiction cases satisfy the underlying goals of specific jurisdiction, and applies this framework in different factual scenarios.
I. BACKGROUND: THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SPECIFIC AND
GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION

The modem doctrine of personal jurisdiction derives from an
oft-quoted sentence in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.3
The Supreme Court held that:
Due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum

,z See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
13.326

U.S. 310 (1945).
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contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."' 4
While there are no mechanical or quantitative criteria to determine
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," the Court
in International Shoe described several jurisdictional landmarks to
help courts navigate these uncertain waters. First, a defendant must
have some contacts, ties, or relations to a state before that state
can exercise jurisdiction over a defendant who is not present in the
forum." Second, if a defendant has one or more contacts with the
forum, the state may be able to subject the defendant to jurisdiction for suits arising out of the forum contacts. 6 Third, if a defendant maintains continuous and substantial contacts with a state,
the state undoubtedly may exercise jurisdiction over the defendant
for claims that arise out of the contacts, and may even be able to
exercise jurisdiction for claims that are unrelated to the forum state
activities. 7
In 1966, Professors Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman
examined the doctrine of personal jurisdiction, and suggested that it
consists of two distinct types of jurisdiction. 8 The first type of
jurisdiction, which von Mehren and Trautman labeled specific jurisdiction, exists when the defendant has a limited number of contacts
with the forum state, but the cause of action for which jurisdiction
is being asserted arises out of (or at least relates to) the contacts. 9 Thus, specific jurisdiction is dispute-specific.
In Lemke case, the facts indicate Dr. Patel regularly solicited
and treated Illinois residents. 0 Thus, an Illinois court could exercise specific jurisdiction over the doctor for a cause of action arising out of a patient's decision to go to Indiana for medical treatment as a result of the solicitation. However, it could not exercise
jurisdiction over the doctor for other causes of action that had no
connection to Illinois.
The second type of jurisdiction, which von Mehren and

14

Id. at 316.

See id.
See id. at 317.
'T See id. at 317-18.
t' See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1135-36 (1966).
'9- See id.at 1144-45.
. See Lemke v. St. Margaret Hospital, 552 F. Supp. 833, 838 (N.D. Il.1982).
"

"
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Trautman labeled as general jurisdiction, does not depend upon the
cause of action, but rather is determined solely by the extent of the
defendant's contacts with the state.2' In Lemke, an Indiana state
court could exercise general jurisdiction over Dr. Patel for any
cause of action because of his substantial contacts as a domiciliary
of Indiana. In 1983, the Supreme Court endorsed the categories of
specific and general jurisdiction as two distinct types of in
personam jurisdiction.'
While the concepts of general and specific jurisdiction are
easily applied to many situations, a significant group of cases does
not fall neatly within either jurisdictional paradigm. Continuing
with the facts of Lemke, Dr. Patel's contacts with Illinois do not
meet the level of contacts necessary to allow Illinois to exercise
general jurisdiction over him. In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Halls the Supreme Court held that the exercise of general jurisdiction over a Columbian defendant would violate the Due
Process Clause, even though the defendant had significant contacts
with the forum.24 Comparing the defendant's contacts in Lemke to
those that were considered insufficient in Helicopteros, it appears
that the Supreme Court would not believe the regular solicitation
of Illinois residents was sufficient to confer dispute-blind jurisdiction over the doctor. Moreover, although an Illinois court could
exercise specific jurisdiction over the doctor for a claim arising out
of his solicitation in Illinois, there were no facts indicating that
Michael Lemke went to Indiana as a result of the doctor's contacts
with Illinois. Although neither general nor specific jurisdiction was
independently satisfied, some of the elements of specific jurisdiction were present-a claim arising out of an injury in Illinois-and
some of the elements of general jurisdiction were present-a significant ongoing relationship with Illinois.'
. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 18, at 1136-37.
2

See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8-9 (1984)

(separating and defining individually "specific jurisdiction" and "general jurisdiction").
n" 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
See iUL; see also infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
" Other examples of jurisdictional situations that do not meet either jurisdictional paradigm are easy to imagine. For example, suppose that a Massachusetts citizen owns a
summer cottage in Maine and that on his way to the cottage he causes an accident in
New Hampshire with a citizen of Maine. The other driver files suit in Maine. In determining whether the Massachusetts citizen should be subject to jurisdiction in Maine, we
must consider his contacts with the state: He has purposefully created contacts with the
state by choosing to own property within the state's territory. Is this sufficient to confer
general jurisdiction over any cause of action? Probably not. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner,
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One might assert that because hybrid jurisdiction does not
independently satisfy either jurisdictional paradigm, it must be
unconstitutional. At least one commentator, however, has argued
that such a hybrid situation might not be unconstitutional.26 Professor William Richman has attempted to synthesize the notions of
specific and general jurisdiction by asserting that there are situations where neither general nor specific jurisdiction would be satisfied, but where the exercise of jurisdiction would still be proper
"because the case is a near-miss on both paradigms." 27 He suggests that personal jurisdiction is based upon a sliding scale model
of the relationship between the quantity and quality of the
defendant's contacts on the one hand, and the relatedness of the
contacts to the cause of action on the other.' Thus, Professor
Richman asserts that general and specific jurisdiction are not discrete categories of jurisdiction but rather "simply the two opposite
ends of this sliding scale."29 While the sliding scale approach has
some appeal, for reasons stated later in this Article, it is not the
appropriate response to the hybrid jurisdiction situation."0 This
interpretation does not necessarily mean, however, that the Constitution requires courts to reject jurisdiction in all hybrid scenarios.

433 U.S. 186 (1977) (stating that ownership of personal property located in the forum is
not sufficient to confer general jurisdiction). Is it sufficient to confer specific jurisdiction
for this particular cause of action? Although he had created a purposeful contact with
Maine by owning property there, was this contact sufficiently related to the car accident
in New Hampshire to justify jurisdiction? The cause of action did not "arise out of" the
defendant's property ownership in the same sense as, for example, a dispute concerning
the ownership of the property. Yet if it were not for the property in Maine, he probably
would not have been driving through New Hampshire when he caused the accident. The
jurisdictional analysis of this fact pattern depends upon how closely related a cause of action must be to the defendant's contacts to justify specific jurisdiction. While this issue is
touched upon here, a full analysis of the appropriate definition of the nexus requirement
is beyond the scope of this Article.
' See William M. Richman, A Sliding Scale to Supplement the Distinction Between
General and Specific Jurisdiction, 72 CAL. L. Rv. 1328 (1984).
. See id. at 1343.
See id. at 1345 ("As the quantity and quality of the defendant's forum contacts increase, a weaker connection between the plaintiff's claim and those contacts is permissible; as the quantity and quality of the defendant's forum contacts decrease, a stronger
connection between the plaintiff's claim and those contacts is required.").
29.Id.
30 See infra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
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II. CAN HYBRID JURISDICTION BE JUSTIFIED AS A FORM OF
GENERAL JURISDICTION?

A. The ConstitutionalRequirements of General Jurisdiction

In determining whether to exercise general personal jurisdiction
over a defendant, a court should look to the defendant's affiliation
with the forum state without regard to the nature of the dispute
being adjudicated.' While it is well settled that a state may exercise general jurisdiction over a citizen, a habitual resident, or a
domiciliary of the state, 2 it is not clear what other relationships
between a forum and defendant, if any, will be sufficient to confer
dispute-blind jurisdiction. The two leading Supreme Court cases
analyzing general jurisdiction over nondomiciliary defendants,
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.33 and Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall,' provide limited guidance on the

application of the doctrine. In Perkins, the Supreme Court held that
a foreign mining corporation that temporarily halted its regular
mining activities in the Philippine Islands and conducted "a continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its general business" in
Ohio was subject to jurisdiction in Ohio for a suit that had no
relation to the defendant's Ohio activities.3' In reaching the conclusion that the defendant's activities in Ohio were "sufficiently

-"- See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9 (1984)
(defining general jurisdiction as the exercise of personal jurisdiction over "a defendant in
a suit not arising from or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum . . "); see
also Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. Cr. REV. 77, 80-81 (discussing the several bases for general jurisdiction); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HtARV. L. REV. 610, 611-12
(1988) (discussing the importance of maintaining the dispute-blind character of general jurisdiction); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 18, at 1136 (defining general jurisdiction
as power to adjudicate "any kind of controversy" when sufficient relationship between the
forum and the defendant has been established).
' See Twitchell, supra note 31, at 633; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 18, at
1137 ("American practice bases general jurisdiction ... on three types of relationship between the defendant and the forum: his domicile or habitual residence; his presence; and
his consent . . . ") (footnotes omitted).
General jurisdiction based upon in-state service of process is an anomaly to the
extent that it allows a court to exercise dispute blind jurisdiction over a defendant that
may not have significant ties to the forum state. See generally Burnham v. Superior
Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (affirming the power of California to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who, while visiting the state, was served with a California court
summons and his estranged wife's divorce petition).
342 U.S. 437 (1952).
466 U.S. 408 (1984).
See Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438.
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substantial" to justify the exercise of dispute-blind jurisdiction, the
Court relied upon the fact that the defendant temporarily maintained an office in Ohio from which the President of the company
and two employees carried on business correspondence, performed
banking activities from two Ohio bank accounts, held directors'
meetings, purchased machinery, and maintained corporate files.'
Although the Court determined that this particular combination of
facts was sufficient to confer general jurisdiction in this case, it
failed to elucidate the necessary characteristics of dispute-blind
jurisdiction for future applications of the doctrine.
Thirty years after Perkins, the Court again considered the application of general jurisdiction, this time deciding that the particular
facts were not sufficient to justify dispute blind jurisdiction. In
Helicopteros, the Court held that Texas did not have a sufficient
affiliation with the Colombian defendant to justify the state's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a dispute involving a helicopter
accident that occurred in Peru." As in Perkins, the Court listed
the defendant's forum contacts, which included sending a corporate
officer to Texas to negotiate a contract, purchasing over four million dollars worth of helicopters and equipment in Texas over an
eight year period of time, sending its employees for training in
Texas, and accepting checks drawn on a Texas bank account. 8
The Court discredited the one-time negotiation session as not being
"continuous and systematic" in nature, 9 and held the acceptance
of Texas drawn checks as being the "unilateral activity of another
party," thus removing both contacts from the jurisdictional analysis.' The Court then held that "purchases and related trips, standing alone, are not a sufficient basis for a State's assertions of
[general] jurisdiction."4 Again the Court provided little or no
guidance as to what characteristics would be deemed sufficient to
justify a state's exercise of general jurisdiction in future cases.
In the absence of substantial guidance from the Supreme Court,

id. at 447-48.
" See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418-19 (1984). In
Helicopteros, the Court did not even attempt to apply a specific jurisdiction analysis, noting that "[aill parties to the present case concede that respondents' claims against Helicol
did not 'arise out of,' and are not related to, Helicol's activities within Texas." Id. at 415
3

(footnote omitted).
-". See id. at 410-11.
. See id. at 416.
. Id. at 417.
I' (citing Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923)).
Id.
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several scholars have attempted to flesh out the underlying rationale and limits of general jurisdiction. Professor Mary Twitchell
believes that the essential function of general jurisdiction is to
provide a predictable "forum where a defendant may always be
sued."'42 She has described the "traditional indicia" of general jurisdiction to include: "a home base, an agent for service of process,
a local office, or the pursuance of business from a tangible locale
within the state."'43 Professor Twitchell asserts that in many instances, courts incorrectly apply general jurisdiction when the
claims upon which jurisdiction is asserted are tenuously related to
the defendants' forum activities, but the defendants lack any of the
traditional justifications of applying general jurisdiction.'M The use
of general jurisdiction in this situation dilutes the requirements for
dispute-blind jurisdiction and also hinders the development of a
comprehensive body of dispute-specific jurisdiction by failing to
confront difficult specific-jurisdiction
scenarios.45 Professor
Twitchell asserts that general jurisdiction is only justifiable in situations where the affiliation between the defendant and the forum is
so significant that the defendant would expect to be sued there for
most claims asserted against it. She would limit general jurisdiction to "true 'insiders."' 47
Professor Lea Brilmayer has also addressed the subject of general jurisdiction.' In attempting to ascertain the justification for
general jurisdiction, she notes that domicile-particularly an
individual's domicile-is traditionally the strongest basis for the
assertion of general jurisdiction.49 She then considers the reasons
why individual domicile presents a compelling case for allowing
states to exercise dispute blind jurisdiction, concluding that domicile satisfies four major theoretical justifications for the exercise of
jurisdiction: (1) convenience to the defendant; (2) convenience to

Twitchell, supra note 31, at 667.
3

d. at 635.

"3See id. at 635. She notes that this occurrence is particularly common in suits involving sales of products or services in the forum. See id.
,5 See id. at 650.
See id.at 637, 680 (asserting that courts "In]ever ask the question that is crucial
to a truly dispute-blind jurisdiction analysis: whether the defendant's contacts are such that
the exercise of jurisdiction would be fair for most causes of action brought by the plaintifT) (footnote omitted).
41-Id. at 651.
" See Lea Brilmayer, A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TFX. L. REV. 721

(1988).
49"See id. at 730.
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the plaintiff by providing a predictable place where the defendant

may be sued; (3) sovereign power to compel a defendant to appear
in court and to enforce a judgment; and (4) the exchange of benefits (voting, welfare, education, etc.) and burdens (for example
being subject to the state's laws, including jurisdictional legislation)
between the defendant and the forum." Based on this analysis,
she concludes that the defendant's state of domicile, state of incorporation, and principal place of business form sufficient grounds
for the exercise of general jurisdiction because they satisfy these
jurisdictional justifications." Additionally, general jurisdiction is
justified if a defendant conducts sufficient intra-state activities to
make it fair for the state to regulate the activities of the defendant
as an insider. 2
The commonality between the theories of general jurisdiction
described by Professors Twitchell and Brilmayer is substantial.
Both professors believe that general jurisdiction is appropriate over
a limited class of defendants-those that are, or resemble, "insiders" at the time the lawsuit is filed. 3 Most of the characteristics

" See id. at 730-33 ("When a state applies its long-arm statute to attain jurisdiction
over a domiciliary, it simply requires the domiciliary to adhere to a -local law that theoretically the party had a chance to influence.").
S. See id. at 728-35.
s See id. at 744. Professor Brilmayer distinguishes between intra-state activities and
inter-state activities because of their effects on interstate commerce. She asserts that instate activities by outsiders are more likely to involve interstate transactions than in-state
activities by locals and thus, to the extent that predicating jurisdiction on in-state activities
discourages such activities, jurisdiction over outsiders on this ground may violate the commerce clause. See id. at 743. She thus asserts that a defendant's interstate activity should
be "discounted" in the general jurisdiction analysis in order to avoid unduly burdening interstate commerce. See id.
Professor Brilmayer considers other traditional grounds for exercising general jurisdiction, such as transient jurisdiction, consent, and property. Although she asserts that transient jurisdiction has "outlived its theoretical justifications," id. at 755, the Supreme Court
endorsed the continued vitality of transient presence as a basis for general jurisdiction. See
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (holding that service of process on a
New Jersey resident while visiting California sufficed to confer personal jurisdiction over
him). Professor Brilmayer asserts that statutorily-induced consent to general jurisdiction is
not constitutionally justifiable. See Brilmayer, supra note 48, at 758-60 (asserting that statutes "which in effect require consent to jurisdiction, circumvent all due process notions of
fairness underlying minimum contacts analysis and expose the fiction of consent as a basis for jurisdiction"). Finally, she considers the relevance of property contacts in the general jurisdiction analysis and asserts that such contacts should not be completely discounted and ignored in the analysis. See id. at 766.
'" Compare Brilmayer, supra note 48, at 782-83, with Twitchell, supra note 31, at
680 ("The court should exercise general jurisdiction only if it finds that the defendant's
ties with the forum are so significant that the defendant should have expected to be an-
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from which "insider" status may be implied involve unique relationships between the defendant and the forum-domicile, "incorporation, and principal place of business.5 4 While "insider" status
may also be based upon a relationship with the state that is not
unique, both Professors Brilmayer and Twitchell suggest limiting
this category of general jurisdiction to defendants who conduct
substantial activities from within the state, such as from a local
office5
From a pragmatic perspective, limiting general jurisdiction to
these categories of situations provides a relatively clear test for
courts to determine general jurisdiction. The unique relationships
are based upon well-defined legal standards that courts regularly
apply in determining diversity jurisdiction.56 Moreover, the
nonunique relationships-in which the defendant conducts substantial intrastate activities-may not pose difficult application problems
either. For example, a defendant will not usually open a local
office unless there is sufficient continuous activity in the state to
warrant the expense of maintaining the office. Thus, it would seem
that the existence of a local office will tend to also show continuity and substantiality of the contacts. These limited categories also
tend to distinguish the grounds for general jurisdiction from the
grounds that justify specific jurisdiction, helping to avoid the temptation to mix them together to find jurisdiction over "near-miss"
situations. While the Supreme Court has never taken the opportunity to clearly define the characteristics of general jurisdiction, limiting general jurisdiction to "insiders", or those who resemble insiders, is theoretically justifiable and pragmatically appealing.
B. Does Hybrid Jurisdiction Satisfy the ConstitutionalRequirements for GeneralJurisdiction?
Hybrid jurisdiction provisions often condition the exercise of
jurisdiction on whether the defendant "regularly does or solicits
business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or
derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state .... ."' One could argue that this lanswerable to most claims asserted against it within the forum.").
u See Brilmayer, supra note 48, at 728-35.

See id. at 744; Twitchill, supra note 31, at 635.
A look at some of the diversity jurisdiction cases may indeed indicate that domicile is not necessarily "clear" or "easy" to determine, but the legal standard upon which it
is based is well-defined and thus provides courts with a clear road map of the factual issues that are relevant.
-m UNIF. INTERSATE AND INT'L PROCEDURE Acr § 1.03, 13 U.L.A. 361 (1986); see
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guage authorizes general jurisdiction because the provision requires
ongoing contact with the state. Moreover, the provision is written
in the present tense, thus focusing on the defendant's contacts with
the forum at the time the suit is filed, rather than the defendant's
contacts at the time the events giving rise to the suit occurred.
Notwithstanding these general jurisdiction characteristics, the existing hybrid jurisdiction provisions do not satisfy the constitutional
requirements for general jurisdiction.
There are several problems with attempting to "fit" hybrid
jurisdiction into the general jurisdiction paradigm. First, the longarm statutes that attempt to authorize hybrid jurisdiction are not
dispute-blind. For example, the hybrid jurisdiction provision contained in the Uniform Act authorizes jurisdiction only over causes
of action, "arising from the person's ...causing tortious injury in
this state by an act or omission outside this state .. "..58
Whether the cause of action arises out of a tortious injury that occurred
within the forum state is irrelevant to a general jurisdiction analysis. 9
Second, even if the existing hybrid-jurisdiction provisions attempted to authorize dispute-blind jurisdiction, they would likely
not satisfy the constitutional standard for general jurisdiction. The
hybrid jurisdiction provision contained in the Uniform Act and
most other state long-arm provisions are not narrowly tailored to
meet the high threshold of contacts required by the Supreme
Court." For example, one could argue that the defendants in
Helicopteros engaged in a "persistent course of conduct" in Texas
from 1970-77 by purchasing helicopters and other parts and regularly sending their employees there for training. Yet, we know that
the exercise of general personal jurisdiction in that case violated
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.6'

supra note 11 for a list of states that have adopted hybrid jurisdiction provisions.
" UNIF. INTERSTATE AND INT'L PROCEDURE Acr § 1.03, 13 U.L.A. 361 (1986).
The Delaware and Maryland hybrid provisions come close to conferring dispute
blind jurisdiction. Both statutes confer jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of a
tortious injury within the state or outside the state by conduct that occurred outside of the
state, so long as the nonresident regularly carries on business, or engages in other persistent courses of conduct in the state. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3104(c)(4) (Supp. 1996);
MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PRoc. § 6-103(b)(4) (1997). Even these statutes are not
truly dispute blind, however, because they are limited to tortious claims that arise from
out-of-state conduct. See id.
. See supra note 11 (listing these statutes).

. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 408, 411 (1984).
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Moreover, the provisions do not distinguish between forum
activities from a local office and forum activities from outside of
the state, even though activities from within the state appear to
provide a stronger argument for the assertion of general jurisdiction
than activities from outside of the state. Any defendant that regularly conducts forum activities will satisfy the language of the
statute, even though the activities may be so insignificant that the
defendant would not expect to be hailed into court there for any
cause of action.
Thus, the existing hybrid jurisdictional provisions do not authorize dispute-blind jurisdiction, and even if they did, they are not
narrowly tailored so as to meet the apparent underlying constitutional rationale of general jurisdiction. Therefore, hybrid jurisdiction
cannot be justified as a form of general jurisdiction.
1Il. CAN HYBRID JURISDICTION BE JUSTIFIED AS A FORM OF
SPECIFIC JURISDICrION?

A. The ConstitutionalRequirements of Specific Jurisdiction: The
TraditionalDoctrine
Specific personal jurisdiction requires that: (1) a defendant
purposefully create a contact with the forum state that gives rise to
(or at least relates to) the cause of action for which jurisdiction is
being asserted, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction be reasonable.62
The Court described the interplay between these criteria in Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzeiwic. 63
Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully
established minimum contacts within the forum State, these
contacts may be considered in light of other factors to
determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction
could comport with "fair play and substantial justice." Thus
courts in "appropriate case[s]" may evaluate "the burden on
the defendant," "the forum State's interest in adjudicating
the dispute," "the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient
and effective relief,....
the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies," and the "shared interest of the several States in fur-

See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
"

471 U.S. 462 (1985).
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thering fundamental substantive social policies." These
considerations sometimes serve to establish the reasonable-

ness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum
contacts than would otherwise be required. On the other
hand, where a defendant who purposefully has directed his
activities at forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he
must present a compelling case that the presence of some
other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable. 6'
Unlike general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction may hinge on
very few contacts-as few as one 65 -between the forum and the
defendant if the contacts are purposeful and the cause of action
that is the subject of the suit arises out of the forum contact. Specific jurisdiction does not require physical presence in the forum.'
Rather, a minimum contact may be created by anyone who purposefully directs his or her activities toward a state, even if that
person has never set foot in the state.67
The hybrid jurisdiction provisions at issue in this Article satisfy
several of the requirements for specific jurisdiction. They require a
defendant to have "regular," "persistent," or "substantial" contacts
with the forum state,' certainly more than are minimally required

Id. at 476-77 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (holding a
Texas life insurance company liable for judgment entered against it in California when the
company's sole connection with the forum was a life insurance contract with a California
resident).
' See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (holding that when a defendant has engaged in
significant activities within the forum state, jurisdiction may not be avoided based on lack
of physical presence); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984) (holding that Florida
residents, who wrote and published a tabloid article which allegedly defamed a California
resident, may be subject to jurisdiction in California). The Court in Calder held that causing injury to California resident in California is sufficient to subject them to jurisdiction.
See id.
' For example, if a person stands 10 feet from the state boundary and fires a pistol
into the state causing property damage, the state may exercise jurisdiction over the person
for a claim arising out of the shot because he has created a purposeful contact with the
state and the cause of action arises out of the shot. See REsTAThMENT (SECOND) OF CONFaCT OF LAWS § 37 (1971) ("Causing Effects in State by Act Done Elsewhere").
'- The Uniform Act applies if the defendant causes injury in the forum and "regularly
does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state."
UNIF. INTERSTATE AND INT'L PROCEDURE ACT § 1.03(a)(4), 13 U.L.A. 361 (1986). It is
interesting to note that the first two categories of conduct-regularly doing business in the
state or engaging in persistent conduct in the state-require the defendant to purposefully
create a relationship with the state. The third category of conduct on the other hand-de'5
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to exercise specific jurisdiction. Moreover, the provisions are dispute-specific, allowing jurisdiction only over a cause of action arising out of an injury in the forum caused by the defendant. Notwithstanding these characteristics, the hybrid jurisdiction provisions
do not satisfy the traditional specific jurisdiction paradigm because
they do not require the plaintiff's cause of action to arise out of
(or even relate to) the defendant's forum contacts. The following
section of this Article will consider whether jurisdiction may be
constitutionally justifiable in the absence of a causal relationship
between the plaintiff's claim and the defendant's forum contacts
and, if so, how courts should determine the constitutionality of
jurisdiction in such factual scenarios.
B. Is a Causal Relationship between the Claim and the Contacts
Required by the Constitution?
1. The Supreme Court Has Left the Door Open for One to Argue
that Specific Jurisdiction May Rest Upon Contacts that Are Not
Causally Related to the Plaintiff's Claim
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that specific
jurisdiction requires a relationship or nexus to exist between the
defendant's forum contacts and the plaintiffs cause of action, on
several occasions the Justices of the Court have hinted that specific
jurisdiction may hinge upon contacts that are not causally related
to the plaintiff's claim. In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court,' the plaintiff filed a product liability action in California
state court alleging that defects in the tire on his motorcycle
caused the tire to explode, resulting in serious injury to him and
death to his passenger. The plaintiff named several defendants,
including the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tire tube, Cheng Shin
Rubber Industrial Co., Ltd. ("Cheng Shin").70 Cheng Shin filed a
claim in the same suit against Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd.

riving substantial revenue from goods used or consumed in the state-encompasses less
purposeful activity on the part of the defendant. The Supreme Court has not definitively
decided whether a defendant who knowingly derives substantial revenue from goods used

in the state has a sufficient purposeful contact to justify the exercise of jurisdiction for a
claim arising out of the use of the goods in the state. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Industry Co.

v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (discussing whether placing a product into the
stream
mately
69
'-.

of commerce creates a purposeful contact with the state where the product is ultisold to a consumer).
480 U.S. 102 (1987).
See id. at 106.
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("Asahi"), the Japanese manufacturer of the tire tube's valve assembly.7' Ultimately, all of the plaintiff's claims were settled,
leaving only the claim between Cheng Shin and Asahi. Asahi
moved to dismiss the claim for lack of personal jurisdiction.73
In determining whether Asahi was subject to personal jurisdiction in California, the Court cited Asahi's business relationship
with Cheng Shin and its contacts with the forum. The Court noted
that Asahi manufactured tire valve assemblies in Japan and sold
them to Cheng Shin in Taiwan, who then incorporated the assemblies into tire tubes.74 The sales took place in Taiwan, and the assemblies were shipped from Japan to Taiwan.75 Sales to Cheng
Shin accounted for 1.24% and 0.44% of Asahi's income in 1981
and 1982 respectively.76 Cheng Shin purchased tire valve assemblies from Asahi, as well as other manufacturers, and approximately 20% of Cheng Shin's sales in the United States were in California.' There was evidence indicating that Asahi was aware that
Cheng Shin sold its products in California and other states. 8
In determining whether Asahi was subject to jurisdiction in
California, a majority of the Court held that it would be unreasonable to hail Asahi into a California court for this claim.79 Justice
O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell and
Justice Scalia, believed that Asahi did not have minimum contacts
with California because it did not purposefully avail itself of the
California market.8 " In support of this position, Justice O'Connor

71 See id.
7.

See id. at 105-06.

71.

See id. at 106.

74.See id.
7S. See id.

See id. It is interesting to note that the Court cites data relating to Asahi's business relations with Cheng Shin for the period from 1978 through 1982 but it does not
indicate why it has chosen this time period. Specific jurisdiction is traditionally based
upon the defendant's contacts with the forum that gave rise to the claim. If specific jurisdiction required a causal relationship between the defendant's contacts and the plaintiffs
claim, the relevant contacts would have to have occurred at or before the time of the
plaintiff's accident. General jurisdiction, on the other hand, is based upon the defendant's
contacts with the forum at the time the complaint is filed. Here, the accident occurred in
1978 and the plaintiff filed his complaint in 1979, yet the Court cites information relating
to Asahi's and Cheng Shin's contacts with California as late as 1983. See id.at 106-07.
77 See id.at 106.
- See id. at 106-07 (noting affidavit of Cheng Shin manager).
79- See id. at 114, 116-17,
121-22 (considering the unreasonableness of subjecting
Asahi to California's jurisdiction under these circumstances).
" See id. at 112.
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stated that:
The placement of a product into the stream of commerce,
without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully
directed toward the forum State. Additional conduct of the
defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the
market in the forum State, for example, designing the product for the market in the forum State, advertising in the
forum State, establishing channels for providing regular
advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the
product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as
the sales agent in the forum State. But a defendant's
awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep
the product into the forum State does not convert the mere
act of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State."
According to Justice O'Connor, to find specific jurisdiction over a
defendant who has placed its product into the stream of commerce
with the knowledge that the product would be sold in the forum
state, there must be some "additional conduct" indicating that the
defendant intended to serve the market.82 This is an apparent departure from the traditional specific jurisdiction doctrine. Under the
traditional doctrine, only those contacts that give rise to (or relate
to) the suit are relevant to the jurisdictional calculation.83 Thus,
for example, the fact that the defendant advertised its products in
the forum state should be irrelevant to a specific jurisdiction analysis unless the plaintiff purchased the product as a result of the
advertisements. By asserting that courts should consider "additional
conduct" that is unrelated to the plaintiff's claim-or by failing to
limit the "additional conduct" to facts that are related to the cause
of action-Justice O'Connor, and the three other justices who
joined in this portion of her opinion, seem to endorse a hybrid
jurisdiction concept pursuant to which contacts that are unrelated to
the plaintiff's cause of action may be used to strengthen otherwise
insufficient related contacts.
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson," the Court
also opened the door for one to argue that contacts that are not

Id.
I.
'"

See id.

See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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causally related to the plaintiff's claim, may be considered in the
specific jurisdiction analysis. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiffs purchased an Audi vehicle in New York. 5 After purchasing
the vehicle in New York, they embarked upon a cross-country trip
and got into a serious accident in Oklahoma. 6 The plaintiffs filed
a product liability suit in Oklahoma state court against the following defendants: the New York dealer that sold them the car;, the regional distributor that distributed Audi vehicles in New York, New
Jersey, and Connecticut; the importer ("Volkswagen") that imported
all Audi vehicles from Germany into the United States; and the
automobile manufacturer ("Audi") that manufactured the vehicle at
issue in Germany. 7 The Court dismissed the New York dealer
and the regional distributor for lack of personal jurisdiction because
they did not purposefully reach out to create a contact with Oklahoma.88 In dicta, the Court implied that Audi and Volkswagen,
who did not contest personal jurisdiction, could be hailed into an
Oklahoma court:
[1]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor
such as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated
occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer
or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for
its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject
it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective
merchandise has there been the source of injury to its
owners or to others. The forum State does not exceed its
powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal
jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into
the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will
be purchased by consumers in the forum State. 9
Although this language is ambiguous, one plausible interpretation is
that the Court is stating that Oklahoma would not violate the Due
Process Clause by asserting jurisdiction over Audi and Volkswagen
for the Robinsons' cause of action because the defendants purposefully served the Oklahoma market, and because one of their allegedly defective vehicles was the source of injury to the Robinsons

'"
',
'T

See id. at 288.
See id.
See id.

. See id. at 299.
19-Id. at 297-98.
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in Oklahoma. Under this interpretation, the Court implied that specific jurisdiction may exist in the absence of a causal relationship
between the defendants' forum contacts and the plaintiff's cause of
action. The Robinsons purchased their vehicle in New York, and
they drove it to Oklahoma. While Audi and Volkswagen had pur-

poseful contacts with Oklahoma (they sold many vehicles from
dealerships located in Oklahoma), there was no causal relationship
between their forum contacts and the Robinsons' cause of action."
2. If One Argues that a Causal Relationship between the Claim
and the Contacts Is Not Required, How Do We Define the
Characteristics of Specific Jurisdiction?
While one may argue that language in Asahi and World-Wide
Volkswagen lends support to the argument that specific jurisdiction
may rest upon contacts that are not causally related to the
plaintiff's claim, the Court has given little indication of the jurisdictional characteristics that might justify the exercise of specific
jurisdiction in the absence of a causal nexus."

Admittedly, the quoted language is susceptible to other interpretations. For example,
it may be argued that the Court was attempting to clarify the purposeful availment aspect
of the minimum contacts test, and not really focusing on the nexus requirement. The sentence preceding the quoted language states:
When a corporation "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State" .. . it has clear notice that it is subject to
suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are
too great, severing its connection with the State.
Id. at 297.
The Court then expands upon this notion of purposeful availment in the language
quoted in the text by stating that a defendant who intentionally serves, either directly or
indirectly, a market other than its home market will be considered purposefully availing
itself of the benefits of the state. See id. Under this interpretation, the Court is not addressing the Robinsons' particular cause of action but rather is focusing on the
defendant's direct or indirect contact with the forum. See id.
" To date, the Supreme Court has provided very little guidance on how the nexus
requirement may be satisfied. While the Court has had several opportunities to explore the
issue, it has chosen to avoid it. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991);
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). In the absence of
guidance from the Court, lower courts and commentators have struggled with various interpretations of the nexus requirement. Many courts have suggested that a defendant's forum contacts must be causally related to the legal claim that is the subject of the lawsuit,
but there is disagreement on how tight the causal link must be. Some courts assert that
the defendant's contacts must be a proximate cause of the claim in order to satisfy the
specific jurisdiction requirement; other courts assert that if the claim would not have arisen "but for" the defendant's forum contacts, the exercise of specific jurisdiction is appropriate. See, e.g., Nowak v. Tak How Investments, Ltd., 94 F.3d 708 (1st Cir. 1996)

580

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[VCol. 48:559

a. The Weaknesses of a Sliding Scale Analysis
As noted earlier in this Article, Professor Richman has suggested that there are situations where jurisdiction should be considered
appropriate even though the defendant's contacts are not substantial
enough to satisfy the general jurisdiction paradigm and the contacts
are not sufficiently related to the plaintiff's cause of action to
satisfy the traditional specific jurisdiction paradigm .' Under his
sliding scale theory, there is an inverse relationship between the
quantity and quality of the defendant's contacts and the relatedness
of those contacts to the cause of action.93 Thus, when a defendant
has very few contacts with the forum, jurisdiction will exist only if
the plaintiff's cause of action is closely related to the contacts, but
if a defendant has a significant number of contacts with the forum,
jurisdiction will exist for claims that are more tenuously related to
the defendant's contacts.94 Finally, when a defendant has a sufficient number of contacts to justify the exercise of general jurisdiction, jurisdiction will exist for any cause of action. 5
While the sliding scale approach is appealing in some respects,
there are some difficulties with its application. First, the sliding
scale model has an inherent tendency to dilute jurisdictional requirements. As an example of the "near-miss" situation, Professor
Richman poses a hypothetical involving a defendant that manufactures a drug in Illinois and distributes it in every state, including
California.' The defendant has sales people in California who
solicit orders for the drug from doctors, hospitals, and pharmacies
in California, and the defendant earns substantial revenue from
sales in California.' In the hypothetical, the plaintiff, a California
resident, purchases the defendant's product while on a trip in New
York and suffers injury in New York. 8 Professor Richman asserts

("Courts differ over the proper causative threshold [for exercising specific jurisdiction].
The Ninth Circuit is the most forceful defender of the 'but for' test. . . . Our Circuit has
been recognized as the main proponent of the proximate cause standard."). Professor
Brilmayer suggests that the defendant's forum contacts must form a substantively relevant
fact that is part of a well-pleaded complaint in order to satisfy the nexus requirement. See
Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, 1980 Sup. Cr. Rnv. 82.
See Richman, supra note 26, at 1342-43.
See id. at 1345.
See id.
'5 See id.
See id. at 1343.
'
See id. at 1344.
See id.
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that under the sliding scale model the defendant should be subject
to California jurisdiction in this case even though neither specific
or general jurisdiction is satisfied. 9
Suppose, however, a subsequent case arises involving a defendant that has a continuous but smaller quantity of sales in California. In determining jurisdiction over this subsequent case, must the
court compare the number of California sales for each defendant to
determine how related the cause of action must be? Should the
court compare the percentage of California sales to overall sales for
each defendant? Is the profit earned in California more or less
important than the number of sales in the state? Should the court
compare the nature of the goods sold by each defendant to determine the "quality" of the contacts? Finally, even if the court is
able to determine that the contacts are less substantial in one case
than another, how much more related must the claim be to the
forum contacts? While the sliding scale model seems to avoid "an
excessively conceptualistic analysis of the notion of claim-relatedness,"' it may open the door for courts to exercise jurisdiction
over claims that have little connection to the forum state.
The second problem with the sliding scale approach is more
theoretical. General jurisdiction requires that a defendant have
"continuous and substantial" contacts with the forum state at the
time the lawsuit is filed. 0 Specific jurisdiction, on the other
hand, depends upon the defendant's contacts with the forum at the
time the events at issue in the lawsuit occurred. The sliding scale
model, however, ignores this temporal distinction and assumes that
the same contacts are relevant to both types of jurisdiction.
Using Professor Richman's hypothetical, let us assume that at
the time the plaintiff purchased the defective drug in New York
and suffered injury, the defendant had no contacts with California.
Specific jurisdiction would not exist because the defendant must
have at least one contact with the forum state that relates to the
cause of action. General jurisdiction, on the other hand, may or
may not exist over this cause of action. If the defendant opens a
manufacturing plant in California after the plaintiff is injured in

" See id.
10 Id. at 1345.
'OLSee Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-CECO Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 569 (2d

Cir. 1996). In determining if a defendant's contacts meet this standard, courts should con-

sider the defendant's contacts with the forum for a reasonable period of time up to and
including the date the lawsuit was filed. See id.
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New York but before suit is filed, the defendant will be subject to
general jurisdiction in California even though it had no contacts
with the forum at the time the cause of action arose." Because
the sliding scale model considers the defendant's contacts at the
time the cause of action arose, not at the time the claim is filed, it
fails to recognize the temporal distinction between the contacts that
are relevant for specific and general jurisdiction. Thus, it seems
that theoretically and pragmatically the categories of general and
specific jurisdiction should be considered separate and distinct from
each other rather than merely as the two extreme points on a continuum of contacts.
b. A Consideration of the Underlying Constitutional Purposes of
Specific Jurisdiction
Although the cases and the sliding scale approach do not necessarily answer the hybrid jurisdiction problem, one need not leap
to the conclusion that hybrid jurisdiction is unconstitutional. The
following section analyzes the purposes and goals of specific jurisdiction and asserts that if these underlying premises may be satisfied in the absence of a causal nexus between the claim and the
contacts, then the exercise of jurisdiction should be considered
constitutional.
Since the genesis of the minimum contacts doctrine, the Court
has repeatedly cited two competing interests as the foundation of
the doctrine: (1) the interest of the defendant in avoiding unfair
and inconvenient litigation, and (2) the interest of the forum state
in regulating conduct within its boundaries and protecting its citizens. In International Shoe Co. v. Washington'0 --where the
Court first adopted the minimum contacts doctrine-the Court
appeared to balance both of these interests. The Court emphasized
the importance of maintaining fairness to the defendant, noting:
To the extent that a [defendant] exercises the privilege of
conducting activities within the state ... the exercise of
that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as
those obligations arise out of or are connected with the

102.

In many instances, the time between the origination of the claim and filing of a

complaint may be sufficiently short to alleviate any significant problem. However, some
cases involve an injury that is not discovered for many years and for which the filing of
a complaint may be quite delayed.
0.3. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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activities within the state, a procedure which requires the
[defendant] to respond to a suit brought to enforce them
can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue."°
Thus, jurisdiction is fair if there is a consensual exchange of benefits and burdens between the defendant and the forum state. Defendants can control their jurisdictional exposure by deciding whether
or not to reap the benefits of contacting the states in exchange for
the burden of being subject to jurisdiction for causes of action that
arise out of or are connected with the defendants' contacts.
Although the Court in International Shoe downplayed the importance of state sovereignty in the jurisdictional calculation-which had been a "bellwether of the Pennoyer line of cases"
prior to the adoption of the minimum contacts test,"° the Court
did recognize that states have a legitimate interest in adjudicating
conflicts arising within their boundaries."° By extending jurisdiction to suits where the defendant's own contacts with the forum
give rise to the cause of action, the Court on the one hand allowed
states to reach out beyond their boundaries to hail in foreign defendants, and on the other hand, limited the reach of state jurisdiction
over those absent defendants to only those matters that impact the
state. The nexus requirement is instrumental in accomplishing the
goal of allowing states to adjudicate controversies over which they
have a legitimate interest while not excessively infringing on the
sovereignty of sister states.
In subsequent cases, the Court continued to juxtapose the
themes of fairness and state sovereignty."r In the late 1950's, the
Court decided two cases that significantly shaped the minimum
contacts doctrine, McGee v. International Life Insurance Co."re
"'

Id. at 319.

201

See Donatelli v. National Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 463 (lst Cir. 1990).

'o'

See Imernational Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320 (noting the significant "presence of Inter-

national Shoe Co. in the state of Washington!).
17

See Donatelli, 893 F.2d at 463 (1st Cir. 1990).
355 U.S. 220 (1957). In McGee, a resident of California purchased a life insurance

policy from an Arizona company. See id at 221. Several years later, International Life
Insurance Co., a Texas corporation, agreed to assume the insurance policy, and it sent a

letter to the insured in California making such an offer. See id. The insured accepted the
offer and made payments on the policy from California until his death. See id. at 221-22.

After the insured's death, the company refused to make payment on the policy. See id. at
222. The named beneficiary, also a citizen of California, filed
suit in a California court.
See id. at 221, 222. The Supreme Court held that California could exercise personal juris-

diction over the Texas insurance company because: (1) the contract had a "substantial
connection" to California, and (2) California had a "manifest interest in providing effective
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and Hanson v. Denckla. " In these two cases, the Court made it
clear that while a state's interest is important in the jurisdictional
calculus, specific jurisdiction will not exist in the absence of a
purposeful contact by the defendant with the forum state." °
During the ensuing years, the Court continued to emphasize the
notion that the defendant's purposeful contacts with the forum are
a primary concern in the jurisdictional equation. State sovereignty,
however, also maintained a role in the equation. In World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,' the Court stated that the minimum contacts doctrine performs two separate but related functions:
"It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a
distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States
through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed
on them
by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal sys2
tem."''
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court noted that foreseeability
and predictability are important factors in the minimum contacts
analysis. The Court stated:

means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims." Id. at 223.
'- 357 U.S. 235 (1958). In Hanson, a Pennsylvania domiciliary executed a revocable
deed of trust appointing a Delaware trust company as trustee for the trust. See id at 238.
Several years after the trust was created, and after the settler had moved to Florida, she
amended certain provisions of the trust. See id. at 238-39. Upon her death, several legatees of the settler's estate filed suit in Florida state court contesting the validity of the
trust. See id. at 240-41. According to Florida law, the Florida court could not adjudicate
the validity of the trust without obtaining personal jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Delaware trustee was not subject to personal
jurisdiction in Florida because it had not purposefully created any contacts with Florida.
See id. at 251. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident
defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. The
application of [the minimum contacts] rule will vary with the quality and nature
of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some
act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.
Id. at 253 (paraphrasing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
"' In McGee, the defendant purposefully created a contact with the state by soliciting
an insurance contract in California with a California citizen, and the state had a legitimate
interest in adjudicating the dispute concerning the contract. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
In Hanson, the defendant trustee did not reach out to create a contact with Florida, and
thus even though the state arguably had a legitimate interest in adjudicating the dispute,
this could not overcome the lack of purposeful contacts by the defendant. See Hanson,
357 U.S. at 253.
4144 U.S. 286 (1980).
Id. at 292.
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[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis
is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way
into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he
should reasonably anticipate being hailed into court there.
The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the "orderly administration of the laws," gives a degree of predictability to the
legal system that allows potential defendants to structure
their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to
where that conduct will and will not render them liable to
suit."'
Thus, jurisdiction must be based upon the defendants' own conduct
in order to allow defendants to predict and control their jurisdictional exposure.
Several years later, in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites,"4 the Court attempted to clarify the
purpose of the minimum contacts doctrine, stating that:
The restriction on state sovereign power described in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp .... must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved
by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source
of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause
itself makes no mention of federalism concerns. Furthermore, if the federalism concept operated as an independent
restriction on the sovereign power of the court, it would
not be possible to waive the personal jurisdiction require11 5
ment.
As a consequence of this statement in Bauxites, it was unclear

"I Id. at 297 (citations omitted).
114- 456 U.S. 694 (1982). The plaintiff, a Delaware corporation, filed suit in Pennsylvania federal court against various insurance companies. See id. at 698. Several of the defendants objected to personal jurisdiction. See id. When these defendants repeatedly refused to comply with discovery orders seeking information necessary to establish personal
jurisdiction, the trial court sanctioned the defendants by assuming the necessary jurisdic-

tional facts were true and thus asserting jurisdiction over the case. See id. at 699. On appeal, the defendants argued that this sanction violated their rights under the Due Process
Clause, and the Supreme Court held that, unlike subject matter jurisdiction which protects
the balance of power between the federal and state governments and is not waivable, personal jurisdiction protects the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process
Clause, and is waivable. See id.at 702-03.
"I Id. at 702-03 n.10.
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what role sovereign power played in the jurisdictional calculation.
Although it seems clear that the defendant's purposeful contacts
with the forum state are a sine qua non to the exercise of personal
jurisdiction under the minimum contacts doctrine, did the Court in
Bauxites mean that sovereign power is irrelevant to the jurisdictional calculation?" 6 Several considerations make this position illogical.
First, if fairness to the defendant is the sole consideration of
the minimum contacts doctrine, the defendant's purposeful contacts
with a forum state should not matter as much as the defendant's
contacts to the geographic area surrounding the court. For example,
suppose a resident of upstate New York purchases a car in his
home town and then gets into an accident in New York with a
citizen of Vermont. The Vermont citizen files suit against the New
York resident in a Vermont state court which is located only five
miles from the defendant's home town and the locus of the accident. The nearest court in New York is several hundred miles
away. If personal jurisdiction depended solely upon protecting the
defendant from having to defend a case in a distant or inconvenient forum without regard to sovereign power, the Vermont court
located just a few miles away would be the most convenient forum
to adjudicate the dispute. Yet, under the minimum contacts doctrine
as we know it, the Vermont court could not exercise personal
jurisdiction in the absence of purposeful contacts by the defendant
with the state of Vermont, and the New York court, located hundreds of miles away, would have personal jurisdiction over the
dispute."7 This result is logical only if considered in light of the
state's interest in regulating conduct within its borders. Vermont

This interpretation is suggested in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,

'

807 (1985) (citations omitted):
The purpose of th[e minimum contacts] test, of course, is to protect a defendant from the travail of defending in a distant forum, unless the defendant's
contacts with the forum make it just to force him to defend there. As we
explained in Woodson, supra, the defendant's contacts should be such that "he
should reasonably anticipate being haled" into the forum. In Insurance Corp. of
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, we explained that the requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction comes from the Due Process
Clause's protection of the defendant's personal liberty interest, and said that the

requirement "represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty."
See Ballard v. Fred E. Rawlins, M.D., Inc., 101 Il1. App. 3d 601 (1981) (rejecting
plaintiff's argument that jurisdiction is appropriate because the forum court is located
within fifteen miles of the defendant's office).
117.
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has no legitimate interest in regulating conduct that occurs on New
York roadways while New York does have a legitimate interest in
regulating such conduct. The example implies that sovereign power
is not irrelevant to the personal jurisdiction analysis.
Second, if limitations on sovereign power are irrelevant to the
minimum contacts doctrine, then the constitutional limitations on
federal and state court jurisdiction should be identical. Yet, they
are not. For example, cases have upheld the constitutionality of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(l)(B),"' which authorizes
personal jurisdiction over defendants who are joined under Rule 14
or Rule 19 if they are served with process within 100 miles of the
court and within a federal judicial district. 9 State courts do not
have this power. If fairness to the defendant were the sole criterion
of personal jurisdiction, there should be no difference between the
rule for state courts and federal courts. The most persuasive reason
for allowing the discrepancy between state and federal court jurisdiction is because the limitations of personal jurisdiction are at
least in part based upon the territorial limits of the sovereign.'
It may be argued that because the federal courts are part of a
single national sovereign, state boundaries do not pose a constitutional limit on the federal court's ability to exercise personal jurisdiction. Rather, courts and commentators that have considered the
issue believe that the Constitution merely requires that a defendant
have minimum contacts with the nation as a whole to justify a
federal court's exercise of personal jurisdiction.'
While the quoted language from Bauxites" raises some interpretive questions, several concepts are clear. The Court does not
expressly declare limitations on sovereign power irrelevant to the

".

See, e.g., Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 1979) (relying

on Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946)).
"9. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(B).
'0
See Robert C. Casad, PersonalJurisdiction in Federal Question Cases, 70 TEX. L.
REv. 1559, 1600 (1992).
2. See Paper Systems Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 967 F. Supp. 364, 369 (E.D. Wis.
1997) (noting that court has personal jurisdiction over defendants who have sufficient contacts with the United States in accordance with the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment); see also Casad, supra note 120, at 1601.
This theory is consistent with Rule 4(k)(2), which authorizes a federal court, in
federal question cases, to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who is not subject to personal jurisdiction in any state court as long as the exercise of jurisdiction is

consistent with the constitution and laws of the United States. See FED. R. Civ. P.
4(k)(2).
2"

See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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minimum contacts analysis. Rather, the Court attempts to clarify its
statement in World-Wide Volkswagen by describing the limitation
on sovereign power as "a function of the individual liberty interest
preserved by the Due Process Clause."'" In essence, the Court
seems to be saying that by requiring the defendant to have purposeful contacts with the forum state, the minimum contacts test
protects the defendant's individual liberty interest and, consequently, also protects the delicate balance of sovereign power between
sister states.'24
c. A Framework Limiting Hybrid Jurisdiction to Those Cases that
Satisfy the Underlying Constitutional Purposes of
Specific Jurisdiction
Under the specific jurisdiction doctrine, a defendant must voluntarily choose to "exercise the privilege of conducting activities
within the [forum] state," before it will be subject to jurisdiction in
the forum."2 Even after it is shown that the defendant has created a purposeful contact with the forum, specific jurisdiction is
traditionally limited to those obligations that "arise out of or are
connected with the activities within the state."'25 Under hybrid
long-arm provisions such as the one contained in the Uniform
Laws, the defendant must have "regular," "persistent," or "substantial" contacts with the forum state, and jurisdiction is limited to
causes of action arising out of an injury that occurred within the
state. 27 However, such hybrid jurisdiction provisions do not require the injury or cause of action to arise out of (or even relate
to) the defendant's purposeful contacts with the forum. Thus, we
must consider whether the purposes and goals of specific jurisdiction can be satisfied in the absence of a causal relationship between the plaintiff's claim and the defendant's forum contacts.
Based upon the discussion in the previous section, the functions
of the specific jurisdiction doctrine are twofold: (1) it provides the
defendant with an opportunity to foresee and control its jurisdic-

. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 703
n.10 (1982).
', See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.13 (1985); see also
JACK H. FREIDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.11, at 137 (1985).
'"
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
126.

Id.

'"
See supra note 11 and accompanying text (listing the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act and similar state statutes).

1998]

HYBRID PERSONAL JURISDICTION

589

tional exposure, and (2) it ensures that the state has a legitimate
interest in adjudicating the case by limiting the reach of state court
jurisdiction to those disputes that impact the state.' While the
presence of a close causal relationship-for example, a proximate
causal link-between the plaintiff's cause of action and the
defendant's contacts ensures that these two functions are satisfied,
jurisdiction need not be rejected merely because a causal nexus is
absent. Rather, as long as the underlying goals of the doctrine are
satisfied, specific jurisdiction should be allowed even if the cause
of action is not causally related to the defendant's forum contacts.
i. Foreseeability
The primary goal of specific jurisdiction is to protect the
defendant's individual liberty interest. As noted by the Court in
Burger King:
By requiring that individuals have "fair warning that a
particular activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of
a foreign sovereign, the Due Process Clause gives a degree
of predictability to the legal system that allows potential
defendants to structure their primary conduct with some
that conduct will and will
minimum assurance as to where
'
not render them liable to suit. "129
In order to subject a defendant to specific jurisdiction for a
claim that is not the proximate result of the defendant's forum
contacts, the plaintiff must show that the defendant created purposeful contacts with the state and that the defendant could have
foreseen that its contacts could result in factual circumstances similar to those that gave rise to the plaintiff's claim. One may argue
that basing jurisdiction on whether the defendant could have foreseen being hailed into court in a particular forum merely begs the
relevant question, because a defendant can only foresee being
hailed into court in a forum that the law declares is appropri30
ate.1
The response to this critique lies in the distinction between
being able to foresee the legal consequences that might result from
a defendant's contacts, and being able to foresee the factual conse23

See supra Part III.B.2.b.

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (citation omitted).
"0 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 311 n.18 (1980)

'29

(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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quences that might result from a defendant's contacts. It is true
that basing jurisdiction on the defendant's ability to foresee the
legal consequences of its conduct-i.e. where it will be subject to
jurisdiction-provides no answer to the question. The defendant can
only foresee the legal consequences of its actions after the court
has declared the legal rules that apply to the conduct. However, a
defendant must be able to foresee the factual consequences that
could result from conduct in the forum. Thus, if at the time the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the forum, the defendant
could have foreseen its forum conduct resulting in factual circumstances similar to those that gave rise to the plaintiff's cause of
action, then the defendant's contact should form the basis for asserting specific jurisdiction in the forum. Conversely, if at the time
the defendant availed itself of the forum it could not have foreseen
its forum conduct resulting in factual circumstances similar to those
that gave rise to the plaintiff's cause of action, then the defendant's
contact with the forum should not form a part of the basis for
asserting specific jurisdiction in the forum.
This theory of foreseeability may be illustrated with the facts
from World-Wide Volkswagen, in which the retail dealer ("Seaway") was incorporated and had its principal place of business in
New York, and had no contacts or relationship with Oklahoma.'
For purposes of discussion, assume the plaintiffs ("the Robinsons")
were residents of Connecticut and that they went to Seaway's
dealership in New York to purchase their vehicle because they saw
an advertisement in a local Connecticut newspaper. After purchasing the vehicle, the Robinsons drove the car to Oklahoma and got
into an accident there.
This foreseeability theory does not create jurisdiction where the
defendant has no contacts, ties, or relations. For example, if we
assume the Robinsons filed suit in Oklahoma one must ask: Could
Seaway have foreseen its forum conduct resulting in factual circumstances similar to those that gave rise to this lawsuit? The
answer is obviously "no," because Seaway had no relationship with
Oklahoma at all, and thus there is no forum conduct from which to
foresee any consequences.
Foreseeability is simple to determine in a straight-forward specific jurisdiction case. For example, assume that the Robinsons
filed suit in Connecticut. Applying the above theory of foreseeabili-

"'

See id. at 288-89.
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ty, one must ask whether at the time Seaway placed its advertisement in the Connecticut newspaper, it could have foreseen the advertisement's resulting in factual circumstances similar to those that
gave rise to this lawsuit. If Seaway purposefully advertised in a
Connecticut newspaper in order to solicit sales of its vehicles to
Connecticut residents, it would have been foreseeable that a Connecticut resident would see the advertisement, travel to New York
to purchase a vehicle and get into an accident due to an alleged
defect in the vehicle. Thus, under this theory of foreseeability,
Seaway's contact with Connecticut (the advertisement) would be a
relevant factor in the determination of whether Seaway should be
subject to specific jurisdiction in Connecticut. The fact that the
accident occurred in Oklahoma, rather than a more likely venue
such as Connecticut or New York, is irrelevant because we are
only considering whether the cause of action was a foreseeable
factual result of the defendant's contacts with Connecticut.
A more difficult foreseeability question arises when one considers the hybrid-jurisdiction scenario. To illustrate the hybrid situation, we may consider whether it is fair to hail Audi and Volkswagen into an Oklahoma court for the Robinsons' cause of action. 32' Under the foreseeability criteria suggested in this Article,
one must ask: Could Audi and Volkswagen have foreseen their
forum conduct resulting in factual circumstances similar to those
that gave rise to the Robinsons' lawsuit? Audi and Volkswagen
could certainly have foreseen being hailed into an Oklahoma forum
for some causes of action because they purposefully availed themselves of the Oklahoma market and profited from sales to Oklahoma citizens. More specifically, when Audi and Volkswagen decided
to distribute their vehicles in Oklahoma, they could have foreseen
being hailed into an Oklahoma court for an allegedly defective
,product that they sold in Oklahoma. This was a foreseeable risk,
and thus they had the ability to calculate the cost of such jurisdictional exposure and incorporate that cost into their operational
expenses.'

"'

For this analysis it does not matter whether we assume the plaintiffs purchased

their vehicle in Connecticut or New York. Because the plaintiffs did not purchase the vehicle in Oklahoma, their cause of action is not causally related to Audi's and
Volkswagen's contacts with Oklahoma.
"' See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. The cost of the jurisdictional exposure may be the cost of additional insurance or it may be the cost of the additional burden of litigating a case in a distant forum. See Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797, 808 (1985).
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If this is so, is it unreasonable or unfair to subject the defendants to jurisdiction in Oklahoma for the Robinsons' Oklahoma
accident? Under the particular facts of the case, it would not seem
unfair to subject Audi and Volkswagen to jurisdiction for the
Robinsons' accident. The type of claim brought by the
Robinsons-a product liability suit resulting from an allegedly
defective automobile-was foreseeable. The Robinsons's accident is
very similar to one that could have arisen out of the defendants'
contacts with Oklahoma-it involved the same type of product that
the defendants voluntarily sell in the forum. Moreover, there is no
evidence that the Robinsons' damages are any more significant
than those that might have resulted from the same product if it had
been sold within the forum. Thus, because the defendants could
have foreseen being hailed into this forum for this type of claim,
the exercise of jurisdiction over Audi and Volkswagen would not
violate the primary purpose of the minimum contacts doctrine-to
protect the defendant from the burden of litigating a dispute in an
unforeseeable and unfair jurisdiction.
ii. The State's Legitimate Interest
Although the primary function of the specific jurisdiction doctrine is to protect the defendant from unfair exercises of jurisdiction, the doctrine also-perhaps secondarily-limits the reach of
state court jurisdiction to those disputes that legitimately impact the
state. To the extent that specific jurisdiction is limited to claims
that are proximately caused by the defendant's forum contacts, the
nexus requirement serves to accomplish this goal. This Article asserts, however, that the existence of a causal relationship between
the plaintiff's claim and the defendant's contacts is not the only
instance in which a state will have a legitimate interest in adjudicating a dispute. As long as a legitimate state interest is shown,
jurisdiction should not be rejected merely because the defendant's
forum contacts are not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's claim.
Again, the facts in World-Wide Volkswagen illustrate the importance of the forum state's interests. In World-Wide Volkswagen,
the state's interest was apparent because the Robinsons were injured while driving an allegedly defective vehicle on Oklahoma
roads.'34 The state has a strong interest in keeping its roadways
and drivers safe, and thus litigating disputes arising from accidents

-

See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288.
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on those roadways. The forum was intimately involved with the
dispute, and was not excessively infringing on the sovereignty of
its sister states. Denying jurisdiction would have contravened such
interests of the forum state.
iii. Other Considerations
In Burger King, the Court stated that once it is shown that a
defendant has minimum contacts with the forum, additional factors
may be considered in determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with "fair play and substantial justice."135 These
factors include:
"[T]he burden on the defendant," "the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute," "the plaintiffs interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief,.... the interstate
judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies," and the "shared interest of the
several States
in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies. '' "3

'31 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (quoting WorldWide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293).
" Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
To some extent, the existence of minimum contacts ensures that the state has a legitimate interest in adjudicating the dispute. Thus, the second factor (the forum state's
interest in adjudicating the dispute) apparently allows the court to consider the extent of
the state's interest relative to other potential forums.
The additional factors give the court the flexibility to consider practical litigation
issues, such as the availability of witnesses and evidence in the forum, the expense of adjudicating the dispute in the forum as opposed to elsewhere, the law that will be applied
in the forum, and convenience. See FRUEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.10, at
129-30 (2d ed. 1993) (suggesting that a court may consider forum convenience and the
economic burden faced by the litigants). However, in many instances these factors will
"be accommodated through means short of finding jurisdiction unconstitutional." Burger
King, 471 U.S. at 477.
Although the Court has never addressed how the relative economic position of the
parties may play into the jurisdictional equation, if at all, Professor Arthur von Mehren
suggests that a comparison of the "[plarties [r]elative [a]bilities to [blear [i]itigational
[b]urdens" should be considered. See Arthur von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and Evaluated, 63 B.U. L. REV. 279, 313 (1983). Professor von
Mehren asserts:

[A] party's economic and psychological ability to litigate in the other party's
forum, as well as his expectations with respect to the possibility that he may
have to do so, decrease as a direct function of the degree to which his normal
activities are localized and have only local effects.
Id. at 314. In addition to the degree to which the party's normal activities are localized
or multistate, relative ability to bear litigation burdens may depend upon whether one or
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These "additional factors" must be considered in conjunction with
the defendant's minimum contacts, not instead of minimum contacts. 37 Although hybrid jurisdiction does not satisfy the traditional minimum contacts test because the defendant's forum contacts
are not causally related to the plaintiffs claim, this Article asserts
that the additional factors mentioned by the Court in Burger King
are relevant to the jurisdictional equation if it can be shown that:
1. at the time the defendant purposefully contacted the
forum the defendant could have foreseen its contact resulting in factual circumstances similar to those that gave rise
to the plaintiff's claim; and
2. the state has a legitimate interest in adjudicating the
dispute.
Continuing the World-Wide Volkswagen analysis, because (1)
Audi and Volkswagen could have foreseen their Oklahoma contacts
giving rise to factual circumstances similar to those that caused the
plaintiff's cause of action, and (2) Oklahoma had a legitimate
interest in adjudicating the dispute, the Court would have to consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be fair in light of
the additional factors mentioned in Burger King.' In the WorldWide Volkswagen case, the plaintiffs had an interest in adjudicating
the dispute where they were present and convalescing. Moreover,
the burden on the defendants was not great in relation to the financial benefit that they gained from conducting business in the forum. Additionally, Oklahoma was a convenient and efficient location to adjudicate a case involving the Robinsons' accident because
the percipient witnesses, police officers, treating physicians, and
automobile mechanics who may have investigated or repaired the
vehicle were located in Oklahoma. Additionally, some of the physical evidence, including the vehicle, the situs of the accident, and
reports made immediately after the accident were available in Oklahoma. Although Audi's design and manufacturing evidence was
located outside of the forum, it was subject to discovery pursuant

both of the parties is involved in a profit-making, commercial activity. See id. at 314,
320. Professor von Mehren does not suggest that courts should consider the financial
wherewithal of the particular parties involved in the pending dispute. Rather, he suggests
that courts should consider the relative ability of the class of plaintiffs or defendants to
which the parties belong. See id. at 313.
".
See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (citations omitted).
. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30, 33, and 34. Finally, it is likely that Oklahoma law would have applied to the controversy because that is
where the accident occurred. Thus, although the claim against Audi
and Volkswagen did not proximately result from the defendant's
contacts in Oklahoma, the purposes and goals of the specific jurisdiction doctrine were satisfied and the exercise of hybrid jurisdiction was consistent with fair play and substantial justice.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED HYBRID JURISDICTION
ANALYSIS

Hybrid jurisdiction provisions typically allow a forum state to
exercise jurisdiction when a defendant "derives substantial revenue
from goods used or consumed" in the forum, "regularly does or
solicits business" in the forum, or engages in a "persistent course
of conduct" in the forum.'39 The following section will consider
each of these types of conduct under the proposed framework.
A. A Defendant Who "Derives Substantial Revenue from Goods
Used or Consumed" in the Forum: Stream of Commerce Cases
There are two types of stream-of-commerce cases that invoke
notions of hybrid jurisdiction. Both of these types of cases involve
defendants who derive substantial revenue from goods used or
consumed in the forum. First, there is the Asahi scenario: A defendant places its product into the stream of commerce knowing that
the product is likely to enter the forum state through the efforts of
other entities in the chain of distribution.'" The product enters
the forum state, is purchased by a consumer there, and causes
injury in the state. In Asahi, Justice O'Connor-and three other
justices-wrote that merely placing a product into the stream of
commerce knowing that the product would indirectly reach the
forum state is not sufficient alone to create a purposeful contact
with the forum. 4 ' In addition to such indirect contacts, these justices wrote that a court considering the purposefulness of the
defendant's relationship with the forum should consider other contacts with the forum, even if they are unrelated to the plaintiff's
cause of action. 42 To the extent that Justice O'Connor's analysis

See supra note 11 and accompanying text (quoting a typical long-arm statute).
.See Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
1" See id. at 112.
'*
Justice Stevens wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he disagreed with
'3'.

Justice O'Connor's purposeful availment analysis. See id. at 122. Nonetheless, he apparent-
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considers contacts that would be irrelevant in a traditional specific
jurisdiction analysis (because they are unrelated to the plaintiff's
claim), she apparently endorses hybrid jurisdiction.
The second type of stream of commerce case involving hybrid
jurisdiction is the World-Wide Volkswagen scenario: A defendant
places its product into the stream of commerce with the knowledge
that it will be carried by other entities in the distribution chain into
many states. A plaintiff purchases the product in one of these
states, brings the product to the forum state (a state in which the
defendant's product is also sold), and the product causes injury in
the forum. In this instance, courts must decide not only whether
the defendant's indirect contacts with the forum are sufficiently
purposeful to satisfy specific jurisdiction, but the court must also
decide whether jurisdiction may be based upon the defendant's
contacts with the forum state even though there is no causal link
between the forum contacts and the plaintiff's claim. This section
of the Article will apply the proposed hybrid jurisdiction analysis
to these two types of stream of commerce cases.
1. Asahi Scenario
The first type of stream of commerce case involves a plaintiff
who purchases the product through normal distribution channels in
the forum state and the product causes injury in the forum. It is
important to recognize that in this type of case there is a connection between the defendant's forum contacts and the claim. If one

ly endorsed the notion that a defendant's forum contacts that are unrelated to the
plaintiff's cause of action may be relevant in a stream of commerce analysis. See id. Specifically, Justice Stevens wrote that a court should consider "the volume, the value, and
the hazardous character of the [product]" in deciding whether the defendant purposefully
availed itself of the forum market. Id. at 122. Allowing courts to consider the volume of
products sold in the forum would allow courts to base their jurisdictional analysis on
sales other than the sale(s) that gave rise to the plaintiff's cause of action.
Justice Brennan also wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he disagreed with
Justice O'Connor's purposeful availment analysis. He noted that

[Als long as a participant in [the stream of commerce] is aware that the final
product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there

cannot come as a surprise. Nor will the litigation present a burden for which
there is no corresponding benefit. A defendant who has placed goods in the
steam of commerce benefits economically from the retail sale of the final product in the forum State and indirectly benefits from the State's laws that regulate and facilitate commercial activity.
Id. at 117.
Thus, Justice Brennan did not believe it was necessary to consider a defendant's
additional, unrelated contact with the forum.
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applies Justice Brennan's analysis from Asahi-that placing a product into the stream of commerce knowing that the product will
indirectly reach the forum creates a purposeful contact with the
forum-then this case will fit the traditional specific jurisdiction
model, and there is no need to resort to hybrid jurisdiction. If, on
the other hand, one applies Justice O'Connor's "stream of commerce plus" 43 theory, jurisdiction will depend upon the
defendant's contacts with the forum that are unrelated to the
plaintiff's claim, thus relying upon a notion of hybrid jurisdiction.
An example of this type of hybrid case is Heins v. Wilhelm Loh
Wetzler Optical Machinery."
In Wilhelm, an employee of a Massachusetts corporation
brought suit against a West German corporation alleging that the
defendant negligently designed and manufactured an optical lens
grinding machine purchased by the plaintiff's employer. 4 The
plaintiff alleged that he was injured by the machine while setting it
up in Sturbridge, Massachusetts."4 The plaintiff filed his complaint in Massachusetts state court, and the defendant moved to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 47
The chain of distribution for the defendant's products was as
follows: The defendant sold its products outright to a Swiss corporation, and the Swiss corporation then sold the defendant's products
to an Illinois corporation who served as the exclusive distributor of
defendant's products in the United States.1 s The defendant maintained no control over the marketing, price, or sales of its products
in the United States. 49 The particular machine at issue in the
case was purchased by the plaintiff's employer after negotiating
with the Illinois distributor, and the machine was delivered to
Sturbridge, Massachusetts. 5 The defendant's only direct contact
to Massachusetts was that during the seven year period from 19771983 it sent an employee to visit Massachusetts on eight separate

'

See id. at 756.

522 N.E.2d 989 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988).
See id. at 990.
'46 See id.
1"
See id.
"4
See id. at 991-92.
"' See id.
Moreover, the defendant did not advertise or employ agents in the United
States, it did not pay federal or Massachusetts income taxes, it owned no property in
Massachusetts, it was not registered to do business in Massachusetts, and it had no banking relations in Massachusetts. See id.at 992 n.1.
" See id. at 992.
",
"'
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occasions, with the purpose of discussing the defendant's products
and/or attempt to solicit sales.' It appears that during none of
these visits did the defendant's employee visit the plaintiffs em15 2
ployer
The Wilhelm court held that the exercise of jurisdiction over
the West German corporation satisfied the Massachusetts long-arm
statute and the minimum contacts test.'53 Applying the hybrid jurisdiction provision of the Massachusetts long-arm statute, the court
held that the first requirement of the provision was satisfied because the plaintiffs complaint alleged that the defendant caused a
tortious injury in Massachusetts due to its negligent design and
manufacture of the grinding machine in West Germany. 4 Additionally, the court held that the defendant satisfied the second requirement of the hybrid provision because it derived substantial
revenue from goods used in Massachusetts.5 5
The court also held that the exercise of jurisdiction over the
defendant satisfied the Due Process Clause. Considering the
defendant's contacts with Massachusetts "cumulatively," the court
held that the minimum contacts test was satisfied because (1) the
defendant was aware that its products had been purchased by Massachusetts customers; (2) the sale of the machine at issue was not
an isolated occurrence but rather the plaintiff's employer had purchased at least three or four other machines from the defendant
and there were "dozens" of the machines at another Massachusetts
plant; and (3) the defendant's employees visited other Massachusetts companies to provide advice or solicit sales of the defendant's
products. 6 Finally, the court held that the exercise of jurisdiction
in this case would not be unduly burdensome or unfair to the
defendant.' 7
While the Wilhelm court's analysis is logical and persuasive,
the court did not apply a traditional specific jurisdiction analysis.
Under the traditional specific jurisdiction paradigm, only those
contacts that arise out of or relate to the plaintiff's cause of action

-. See
152.
See

id. at 993.

". See

id. at 997.

id.

See id. at 993.
"
See id. The machine in question cost about $56,000 and the plaintiff testified that
he had seen "[d]ozens' of machines manufactured by the defendant" at another Massachusetts plant. Id.
See id. at 996.
See id. at 996-97.
'.
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should be relevant to the jurisdictional equation. Thus, the fact that
the plaintiffs employer purchased other machines manufactured by
the defendant, the fact that there were dozens of machines at other
Massachusetts plants, and the fact that the defendant's employees
visited other Massachusetts clients should be irrelevant to a traditional specific jurisdiction analysis. However, because these facts
tend to show that the defendant purposefully created a relationship
with Massachusetts, the court found them to be persuasive.
Rather than attempting to fit the Wilhelm case, and others like
it, into the traditional specific jurisdiction paradigm, this Article
suggests that any contacts that satisfy the underlying goals of specific jurisdiction should be considered relevant to the jurisdiction
analysis, even if they are not causally related to the plaintiff's
claim. In Wilhelm, the defendant placed its products into the stream
of commerce with the knowledge that the products would be distributed-albeit beyond its direct control-in Massachusetts. Thus,
the defendant derived substantial revenue from goods sold in Massachusetts. Moreover, the plaintiffs cause of action arises out of
the purchase of defendant's product in Massachusetts. Thus, the
nexus requirement is satisfied.
In light of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Asahi, however, it is
uncertain if this type of indirect contact is sufficient alone to satisfy the purposeful availment prong of the minimum contacts doctrine. In Wilhelm, the defendant had additional direct contacts similar to those described by Justice O'Connor the defendant sent its
employees to Massachusetts to give advice about its products and
solicit sales of its machines. 5 ' As a result of these contacts, the
defendant could have foreseen being hailed into court in Massachusetts for a cause of action arising out of a sale that resulted from
its direct solicitation in the state. If the plaintiff's claim is similar
to one that could have arisen from the defendant's contacts with
the forum (i.e. if the contacts related to products that are similar to
the one that caused the plaintiff's cause of action), it would not
seem unfair to subject the defendant to jurisdiction in this forum
where it has created purposeful contacts and reaped financial benefits.
The other goals of the specific jurisdiction doctrine are also
satisfied in this case. The State of Massachusetts has a legitimate
interest in adjudicating the case because it involves an injury that

" See id. at 996.
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occurred within the state. Additionally, the plaintiff is an individual
who resides in the forum state and has been injured there; thus, he
has a strong interest in adjudicating the case in Massachusetts. The
burden on the defendant would not be excessive in light of the
international nature of its business and the financial benefits it
derives from the forum. Finally, percipient witnesses, medical witnesses, and some of the evidence relating to the purchase of the
machine would likely be present in Massachusetts. Thus, jurisdiction should be considered consistent with the Due Process Clause
even though the traditional specific jurisdiction analysis is not
satisfied.
2. World-Wide Volkswagen Scenario
As to the second type of stream of commerce case, in
Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc.,' s9 the Eleventh Circuit wrestled with a case that resembled the facts of World-Wide Volkswagen. In Verneulen, the plaintiff purchased a used Renault vehicle
from her brother."6 At the time of the purchase, she and her
brother resided in North Carolina, but shortly after purchasing the
vehicle, the plaintiff moved to Georgia.'
While residing in
Georgia, she was involved in a serious automobile accident on
Georgia State Route 316 which rendered her quadriplegic." She
filed suit in Georgia state court against several defendants, including RNUR ("Renault"), the French manufacturer and designer of
the vehicle she was driving at the time of the accident.
The
complaint alleged that her injuries were caused by the negligent
manufacture and design of the car's passenger restraint system.'1
The defendants removed the case to federal court, and Renault
moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction."
In analyzing whether jurisdiction was appropriate over Renault,
the Eleventh Circuit spent considerable time describing the relationship between Renault and its distributors under their distribution
agreement." Pursuant to the distribution agreement, AMSC pur-

15.

975 F.2d 746 (11th Cir. 1992).

110 See id. at 748.
161. See

id.

162 See id.
163 See id.

16 See id.
16&

Id.

" See id. at 749-53. In summary, the distribution agreement provided that AMSC
would be responsible for marketing and distributing Renault vehicles in the United States,
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chased Renault vehicles in France and exported them to the United
States. 67 AMSC was solely responsible for deciding where in the

United States to send the vehicles."6 Representatives

from

Renault and AMSC met on several occasions and engaged in frequent telephone conversations to exchange ideas regarding "volume
forecasts, monthly projections for orders, changes in vehicle specifications and marketing strategies."'" These conversations resulted
in product modifications to suit the United States market.7 ' There
was no evidence that Renault representatives visited any of the six
Renault dealerships in Georgia, directed any advertising specifically
toward Georgia, or modified any product to fit the Georgia market
17
particularly. 1
Applying these facts to the jurisdictional issue, the court summarily addressed the Georgia long-arm statute and focused its
attention on the Due Process analysis."l Applying Justice
O'Connor's "stream of commerce plus" analysis, the court held
that Renault maintained a distribution network by which its cars
were brought to Georgia, it designed its product for the American
market (including Georgia), it advertised the product in Georgia,

but Renault would be involved in decisions "affecting the sales of its product." Id. at
749. Renault and AMSC jointly created a Marketing Representative Plan that AMSC
agreed to carry out. See id. Although AMSC was responsible for advertising, promoting,
and merchandising Renault products in the United States, AMSC agreed to "work closely
with Renault in the planning and developing of themes and strategy and the related budget." Id. at 750. AMSC agreed to discontinue any advertising that Renault believed to be
injurious to its business. See id. Renault agreed to hold harmless and indemnify AMSC
against any judgment resulting from lawsuits against AMSC for design or other defects in
Renault products and AMSC agreed to allow. Renault to take over the defense of any
such lawsuit if Renault chose to do so. See id. Finally, the agreement required AMSC to
provide Renault oE a regular basis with reports and records pertaining to the distribution
of Renault products. See id. at 750-51.
-.

16&

See id. at 752.
See id.

169.

Id.
t70 See id.
1.

See id.

". See id. at 753. Noting that the courts of Georgia construe the Georgia long-arm
statute to confer jurisdiction to the maximum extent permitted by the Due Process Clause,
the court did not specifically analyze the applicability of the long-arm statute. However,
the court stated that all parties agreed that the relevant long-arm provision was § 9-1091(3), which confers jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of a "tortious injury
in this state caused by an act or omission outside this state if the tort-feasor regularly
does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state
.Id.
at 753 n.13.
I at 756.
Id.
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and it established channels for customers to seek advice concerning
the product in Georgia. The court held that these contacts were
"sufficiently related to [plaintiff's] cause of action to confer specific jurisdiction" because Renault's "activities in Georgia were inextricable links in the advertising and distribution network by which
the appellant obtained her vehicle" and "[m]ore importantly,
[Renault] directly targeted its [product] toward Georgia, and thus
could expect to defend in Georgia the very type of action this case
presents."'"5 Finally, the court concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction in this case would not offend fair play and substantial
justice.'76
The Vermeulen court's analysis is well-reasoned and intriguing.
It is not, however, a traditional specific jurisdiction analysis. Under
a traditional analysis, the court would have had to reject jurisdiction because, regardless of whether the defendant's indirect contacts
with Georgia could be considered purposeful, the plaintiff's cause
of action does not arise out of Renault's Georgia contacts. She
purchased her car in North Carolina, not Georgia. Moreover, she
bought the car second hand from her brother, not from Renault, its
distributor, or a Georgia dealer. Notwithstanding the court's
conclusory statement that Renault's Georgia contacts were "inextricable links" in the network by which the appellant obtained her
vehicle, there is no evidence of a causal link between the
defendant's contacts with Georgia and the plaintiff's cause of action.
But rather than rejecting the Vermeulen court's grant of jurisdiction because the facts do not satisfy the traditional doctrine. and
rather than bootstrapping the analysis to fit the doctrine, we should
instead determine if the exercise of jurisdiction supports the constitutional purposes of specific jurisdiction. As noted previously, the
primary purpose of the minimum contacts doctrine is to provide
the defendant with an opportunity to foresee where its conduct will
subject it to jurisdiction and thus protect the defendant from being
unfairly hailed into a distant and unexpected forum. In the

". See id. There was no evidence that the plaintiff's claim was causally related
these contacts. She did not purchase the vehicle from Renault, AMSC, or a dealer
Georgia, she did not purchase the vehicle as a result of Georgia advertisements, and,
far as the facts tell us, she did not seek advice or service from Georgia dealers. See
at 748.
,'sId. at 760.
See Ud at 762.

to
in
as
id.
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Vermeulen case, we must consider whether Renault's contacts with
Georgia were such that it would be fair to subject it to suit in
Georgia for the plaintiff's lawsuit.
So long as Renault could have foreseen its forum contacts
resulting in factual circumstances that are similar to the factual
circumstances that gave rise to the plaintiff's claim, jurisdiction is
fair to the defendant. As in World-Wide Volkswagen, Renault had
several forum contacts from which it could have foreseen being
hailed into a Georgia forum for a car sold to a consumer in Georgia."n Because the facts that gave rise to the plaintiffs cause of
action are extremely similar to facts that could have arisen from
these contracts, it does not seem unfair to subject Renault to jurisdiction in Georgia."
The secondary purpose of the specific jurisdiction doctrine is to
ensure that the forum has a legitimate interest in adjudicating the
dispute. In Vermeulen, Georgia has a compelling interest in protecting its residents from unsafe products and ensuring the safety of its
roads and highways. The accident that caused the plaintiff's injury
occurred on a Georgia State highway, and thus Georgia is not infringing on a sister state's sovereignty by adjudicating the dispute.
Therefore, the exercise of jurisdiction satisfies the primary and
secondary goals of specific jurisdiction.
The additional factors noted by the Court in Burger King also
indicate that the exercise of jurisdiction over Renault is appropriate. 79 The plaintiff is an individual who resides in Georgia and

See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
" The Vermeulen court noted that the plaintiff's vehicle was a Renault LeCar, and
the defendant's contacts with Georgia related to the distribution, marketing, and advertising
of Renault LeCar. One may consider whether the jurisdictional result would have been
different if the plaintiff had purchased a Renault LeCar from her brother, but the
defendant's contacts with Georgia related to the sale of a different product, such as lawn
mowers or farm equipment. This article asserts that the foreseeable consequences of selling lawn mowers or farm equipment would not be sufficiently similar to the consequences
that gave rise to the plaintiff's claim to satisfy the constitutional purpose of specific jurisdiction.
A more difficult foreseeability question arises if the products are not identical but
are fairly similar. For example, what if the defendant's contacts related to the sale of
pickup trucks instead of LeCar vehicles? In this instance, the court would have to consider the foreseeable uses of the pickup truck and consequences that might arise from those
uses in comparison with the uses of LeCar and the consequences that actually caused the
plaintiffs cause of action. Additionally, the court might consider the passenger restraint
systems in both types of vehicles to determine if they would give rise to similar accidents.
See supra note 136 and accompanying text (listing those factors).
1"
177
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who became crippled as a result of the accident at issue in the
suit. There is no evidence that she is forum-shopping in choosing
the Georgia court. Additionally, the defendant is a large multinational corporation involved in international trade which has earned
substantial profit from Georgia citizens. Based on these facts, it
does not appear unfair to require the defendant to defend itself in
Georgia for the plaintiff's claims. In fact, as noted by the Eleventh
Circuit, Renault agreed to undertake the defense of actions alleging
defects in Renault products.8 0 Finally, much of the evidence relating to the accident, the vehicle, and the plaintiff's recovery is
present in Georgia. Thus, the additional factors espoused by the
court in Burger King indicate that the exercise of jurisdiction is
consistent with fair play and justice.
The Vermeulen and Wilhelm cases illustrate that even though
some stream of commerce cases may not satisfy the traditional
specific jurisdiction doctrine, the exercise of jurisdiction may nonetheless satisfy the underlying constitutional purposes of the doctrine. This Article suggests that jurisdiction under a hybrid theory
is constitutionally permitted in such instances.
B. A Defendant Who "Regularly Does or Solicits Business" in the
Forum
Although stream of commerce cases frequently present compelling arguments for the exercise of hybrid jurisdiction, the hybrid
long-arm provisions at issue in this Article also extend jurisdiction
to other factual scenarios. For example, most long-arm statutes
confer hybrid jurisdiction over a defendant who causes tortious
injury in the forum if the defendant also "regularly does or solicits
business" in the forum.' The courts in the following cases considered whether the defendant's regular solicitation of business was
sufficient to justify the exercise of jurisdiction. In both of the
cases, the courts relied upon general jurisdiction to justify the
exercise of jurisdiction over a claim that did not arise out of the
defendant's forum contacts. In light of the Supreme Court's general
jurisdiction cases and the views of general jurisdiction espoused by
commentators, general jurisdiction was not appropriate in either
case. 2 This Article asserts that a more appropriate analysis

".
I.

"s

See Vermeulen, 975 F.2d at 761.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.
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would have been to determine if the exercise of jurisdiction over
the defendants in each case satisfied the goals of the specific jurisdiction doctrine.
In Northlake Cardiology Associates, Inc. v. Alpha Gulf Coast,
Inc.,' plaintiffs filed suit in Louisiana state court against several
defendants, including Bayou Caddy's Jubilee Casino ("Jubilee Casino'), a casino located in Mississippi.'8 4 The plaintiffs were
healthcare providers who rendered services to participants in
defendant's health insurance plan. They brought suit pursuant to
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), seeking
payment of health insurance benefits from the defendant's health
plan."5 Defendants removed the action to federal court and
moved to dismiss on various grounds, including lack of personal
jurisdiction.'86
In considering whether Jubilee Casino was subject to personal
jurisdiction in Louisiana, the court held that the exercise of jurisdiction over the Casino satisfied the Louisiana long-ann statute8 7
because the defendant caused tortious injury in Louisiana and it
"regularly ... solicit[ed] business" in the forum.'88
The court reached this conclusion based upon an allegation in
the complaint which stated that Jubilee Casino placed billboards
along the interstate highway in Louisiana near the Mississippi
border seeking to attract patrons from Louisiana.'89 The court also
held that the exercise of jurisdiction did not violate the Due Process Clause." Recognizing that the cause of action did not arise
out of the defendant's Louisiana contacts, the court held that Jubilee Casino's "continuous and systematic" contacts with Louisiana-the billboards along the interstate highway-were sufficient to
confer general jurisdiction. 9 '

23
IS
"s
"u
287.

No. 95-2511, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18640 (E.D. La.).
The casino was owned by Alpha Gulf Coast, Inc. See id. at *5.
See id. at *1-'2.
See id. at *2-*3.
The court applied LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3201(a)(4) (West 1991), which pro-

vides for jurisdiction over a nonresident who causes "[ilnjury in this state by an offense
or quasi-offense committed through an act or omission outside of this state if he regularly
does or solicits business or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state." Northlake, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18640, at *7.
2.
Northlake, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18640, at *8.

See id. at *7-*8.
See id. at *11-*12.
".

See id. at *8,*11-*12.
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Although the Supreme Court has not clearly defined the contours of the general jurisdiction doctrine, it is doubtful that the
Court would find placing billboards along an interstate highway
sufficient to confer general jurisdiction over the casino in this case.
For example, in rejecting general jurisdiction over the defendant in
the Helicopteros case, the Supreme Court set a very high threshold
for the exercise of dispute-blind jurisdiction. 192 The Northlake
court summarily concluded that placing a billboard along the interstate highway in the for~im is sufficient to confer general jurisdiction, without even considering the amount of revenue earned from
Louisiana residents. 93 Even if one considers the general jurisdiction theories espoused by Professors Twitchell and Brilmayer, Jubilee Casino's contacts with Louisiana are not such that it should
consider itself "an insider" for purposes of personal jurisdiction."9
It did not conduct intrastate business in Louisiana, it did not have
a physical location in Louisiana, and it did not have the opportunity to affect the laws in Louisiana. Thus, the facts in Northlake
do not appear to satisfy the standards for general jurisdiction.
Moreover, as noted by the Northlake court, the facts of the
case do not satisfy the traditional specific jurisdiction doctrine
because the cause of action does not arise out of the defendant's
forum contacts. 95 Before we conclude that jurisdiction must have
been unconstitutional, we must consider whether this hybrid jurisdiction case satisfies the purposes and goals of the specific jurisdiction doctrine.
In examining Northlake, we must consider whether the defendant could have foreseen its contacts with Louisiana resulting in
factual circumstances similar to the facts that gave rise to the
plaintiff's claim. When the defendant chose to place its billboards
in Louisiana it was purposefully seeking to attract Louisiana resi-

92 See Helicopteros

Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). The

defendant's contacts in Helicopteros, which included sending a corporate officer to the forum to negotiate a contract, purchasing four million dollars worth of helicopters and
equipment in the forum over an eight year period of time, sending employees for training
in the forum and accepting Texas checks, were not sufficient to confer general jurisdiction. See id. at 410-11, 417.
92. The court did state: "It is reasonable to believe that the Bayou Caddy's Jubilee
Casino derives revenue from persons crossing the border to frequent the casino."
Northlake, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18640, at *11. However, the court failed to examine
how much revenue the casino received from that source.
" See supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
19. See Northlake, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18640, at *7.
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dents to its casino. It could have foreseen being sued in a Louisiana court as a result of a resident's activities at its casino, when
attendance at the casino was induced by the billboard. Arguably,
one could assert that jurisdiction would be fair to the defendant if
a claim was brought by a Louisiana resident who went to the
casino without having seen the billboard but who had a claim that
was similar to one that could have been brought by the solicited
Louisiana resident.
Here, however, the plaintiff was not a customer at the casino,
but rather was a medical provider who was owed money for services that it rendered to employees of the casino."9 The facts that
gave rise to Northlake's claim are not a foreseeable result of the
casino's decision to place a billboard on the interstate highway in
Louisiana. Thus, even though the Louisiana hybrid long-arm provision was satisfied, the exercise of hybrid jurisdiction in this case
does not satisfy the primary constitutional purpose of specific jurisdiction. Having failed to adequately satisfy the requirements of
general jurisdiction as well, the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Louisiana court was unconstitutional.
In Lemke v. St. Margaret Hospital,"97 the court held that an
Indiana doctor who solicited and treated Illinois residents in Indiana could be subjected to general jurisdiction in Illinois because he
was "doing business" pursuant to Illinois law.'
Shortly after the complaint was filed, the case was removed to
federal court, and Dr. Patel moved to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction."9 He argued that he should not be subject to Illinois
jurisdiction because he was a citizen and resident of Indiana, he
was licensed to practice medicine only in Indiana, and he treated
the plaintiff's son in Indiana.2oe The court rejected the doctor's
arguments and held that there was a state statutory basis for jurisdiction because St. Margaret Hospital acted as Dr. Patel's agent in
regularly and continuously soliciting Illinois patients to be treated
by Dr. Patel in Indiana ° l In fact, the plaintiff's son was treated

*2.

'9

See id. at

197

552 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. II. 1982).

" Although the Illinois long-arm statute does not include a hybrid jurisdiction provision, see IL. COM . STAT. 110/2-209 (West 1985), such a provision would have been applicable to the facts of this case. The factual history of Lemke was presented in the Introduction section of this Article. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
" See Lemke, 522 F. Supp. at 835.
2 See aeL
2'" See id. at 838.
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by Dr. Patel on the hospital's referral." 2
With regard to the Due Process Clause, the court held that the
defendant had regular and purposeful contacts with Illinois. Moreover, because a significant portion of the patients that Dr. Patel
treated were Illinois residents, the court held that he could have
foreseen being hailed into an Illinois court. 3
As in all hybrid jurisdiction cases, the facts of the Lemke case
do not satisfy the requirements for general or specific jurisdiction.
Although the court held that the doctor was "doing business" under
Illinois law," it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would find
his contacts sufficient to confer general personal jurisdiction. As
noted above, the Court in Helicopteros indicated that the threshold
for general jurisdiction was quite high."' Here, the defendant did
not live in Illinois, he did not have a local office in Illinois, and
he did not perform any services in Illinois. Although the court
relied upon the fact that the hospital continuously solicited Illinois
patients on his behalf,2" we do not know what quantity of his
revenue came from Illinois patients. Thus, it does not seem that the
defendant's contacts in this case are more significant than the contacts that the Court rejected in Helicopteros.tr
Additionally, the traditional specific jurisdiction doctrine is not
satisfied according to the facts elicited by the court. The court held
that the defendant had purposeful contacts with Illinois-the
hospital's active solicitation of Illinois patients which it referred to
Dr. Patel-but it did not determine that this cause of action arose
out of the contacts.2°8 Specifically, although Dr. Patel admitted
that the plaintiff's son was referred to him by the hospital, the
court did not determine whether Michael was taken to St. Margaret
Hospital as a result of the hospital's efforts to solicit patients.
Without this information, the specific jurisdiction analysis is incomplete.
One might reasonably question, however, whether Dr. Patel's
jurisdictional exposure should depend upon the fortuity of why

m See id. at 836.
2- See id. at 839.
See id. at 838.
)S. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
See Lemke, 552 F. Supp. at 838.
" See supra note 192. Even if one applies the tests espoused by Professors Twitchell
and Brilmayer, the defendant in this case does not bear the characteristics of an Illinois
insider.
See Lemke, 552 F. Supp. at 838.
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Michael was brought to St. Margaret Hospital. One might argue
that jurisdiction is no less fair to the doctor whether Michael went
to St. Margaret Hospital as a result of reading their advertisement
in the Illinois phone book than if he went there because the hospital happened to be the closest hospital to his high school. The
traditional specific jurisdiction analysis, however, could turn on
such a difference in facts.
If one analyzes the exercise of jurisdiction over Dr. Patel according to the purposes and goals of the specific jurisdiction doctrine, a logical result may be obtained. First, it would seem that if
the hospital's activities in soliciting patients were attributable to Dr.
Patel, he could have foreseen being hailed into Illinois for a cause
of action arising out of the solicitation of an Illinois resident for
whom he performed medical services. Because the plaintiff's case
is extremely similar to one that could have arisen from these contacts, it does not seem unfair to subject the doctor to jurisdiction
for this claim. Moreover, Illinois has a legitimate interest in adjudicating this case which concerns the death of an Illinois citizen, in
Illinois, arising out of an accident that occurred in a school in
Illinois. Additionally, the plaintiff has a strong interest in adjudicating the case in Illinois where the deceased's representative lives
and where the estate is being settled. Much of the evidence concerning the accident at school and the medical care provided at the
hospital in Chicago will be present in Illinois. Finally, the burden
on the defendant would not be great in light of geographic proximity. Thus, the exercise of jurisdiction in this case arguably does not
offend constitutional standards, and jurisdiction was properly granted.
C. A Defendant Who Engages in a "PersistentCourse of Conduct" in the Forum
The third category of conduct included in most hybrid jurisdiction statutes confers jurisdiction over a defendant who causes tortious injury in the state by an act or omission outside of the state
if he engages in a "persistent course of conduct" in the forum.2"
The following cases illustrate how this provision has been interpret-

'" See supra note 11 and accompanying text. This is the only category of conduct
that is not limited to commercial contexts. Arguably, this language could extend to any
person that has regular conduct with the forum, such as a person who regularly passes

through a state to get to her job, a person who attends school in a state or even a person who visits family or friends in a state.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

('Vol. 48:559

ed by several courts.
In LaNuova D&B, S.pA. v. Bowe Co., Inc.,210 tenants of a
shopping center in Delaware brought suit in Delaware state court
against the contractors and suppliers of Dibiten, a roofing material.
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's improper application
and/or manufacture of the Dibiten installed at the shopping center
resulted in a fire which damaged their premises. The original defendants joined Bowe Co., Inc. ("Bowe"), the New Jersey distributor of the product, and Bowe sought to join LaNuova D&B, S.p.A.
("LaNuova"), the Italian manufacturer of the product.21' LaNuova
moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction."'
The Supreme Court of Delaware held that LaNuova was subject to personal jurisdiction under the hybrid provision of the Delaware long-arm statute, and that the exercise of jurisdiction would
not violate the constitution." 3 Specifically, the court held that
LaNuova allegedly caused a tortious injury in Delaware by an act
or omission outside of the state-negligent manufacturing of the
product-and that it engaged in a persistent course of conduct in
Delaware by "establishing and implementing an insured warranty
program for its product." 214 Pursuant to a manufacturer's warranty
program, every purchaser of Dibiten was entitled to a warranty
upon the completion of the installation of the product. 215 Although the manufacturer's warranty had not been issued or delivered at the time of the fire at issue in the primary case,2 6 the
court held that warranties that had been issued and delivered to
other Delaware consumers amounted to a persistent presence in the
forum by LaNuova. 2 7 Finally, the court held that the exercise of
2-.

513 A.2d 764 (Del. 1986).

211.
211

See id. at 767.
See id. at 766.

2'3.

The Delaware long-arm statute extends jurisdiction over any person who, "[c]auses

tortious injury in the State or outside of the State by an act or omission outside the State
if he ... engages in any other persistent course of conduct in the State." DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 3104(c)(4) (1974).
It is interesting to note that this statute is not limited to injuries caused in the state.
In this respect it appears to confer a type of general jurisdiction over any tortious injuries
caused by the defendant Of course, to the extent that jurisdiction is limited to tortious
injuries caused b' out-of-state conduct, as opposed to other types of claims, the statute is
not completely dispute-blind and thus would not be pure general jurisdiction.
211 LaNuova, 513 A.2d at 769.
211 LaNuova sent the warranties, signed in blank, to Bowe, and Bowe distributed the
warranties to the ultimate consumer upon completion of the roofing job. See id.
216 See id. at 768.
2-7 See id. at 769.
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jurisdiction over LaNuova would not violate the constitution because "the quality and nature of its warranty program provides the
constitutionally required level of minimum contacts."" 8
The Delaware Supreme Court did not specify whether it was
applying general or specific jurisdiction over LaNuova. However, it
appears that the facts of the case do not satisfy either doctrine.
Specifically, in light of the Supreme Court's rejection of jurisdiction in Helicopteros, it is unlikely that the Court would agree that
the extension of a manufacturer warranty to Delaware consumers
would be sufficient to allow Delaware courts to hail in foreign
defendants for dispute blind jurisdiction. If such a warranty program were sufficient to confer general jurisdiction, any manufacturer who included a warranty with its product would be subject to
jurisdiction for any cause of action in any state where a consumer
purchased, installed, or used the product. This appears to be a
much broader interpretation of general jurisdiction than the Due
Process Clause would allow.
Specific jurisdiction also fails. In this case the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that the plaintiff's cause of action did not
arise out of the manufacturer's warranty because the fire occurred
before the roofing job was completed, and the warranty had not
yet been delivered. Thus, jurisdiction over LaNuova was unconstitutional unless, as suggested in this Article, the purposes and
goals of the specific jurisdiction doctrine are satisfied.
Under the traditional doctrine, the warranties would be irrelevant to a specific jurisdiction analysis because they do not relate to
the particular cause of action at issue in the case. This Article asserts that the warranties should be considered relevant to the jurisdictional analysis if such consideration satisfies the purposes and
goals of the specific jurisdiction doctrine. Thus, one must first
consider whether the defendant could have foreseen being hailed
into a Delaware court as a consequence of its issuing manufacturer
warranties to Delaware consumers. When the defendant decided to
distribute its warranties to all consumers who purchased and installed its product, knowing that some of those consumers were
located in Delaware, it could have foreseen being hailed into court
for alleged breach of warranty by a consumer who received a
warranty. Although the plaintiff in this case had not received the
warranty at the time that the fire took place, this cause of action is

211. Id.

at 770.
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extremely similar to one that could have arisen as a result of a
warranty that was delivered in the state. Thus, it does not seem
unfair to subject the defendant to jurisdiction for this type of suit.
Second, one must examine whether the forum has a legitimate
interest in this case. All states seek to protect their citizens from
defective goods that are sold, installed, and cause injury in the
forum. Therefore, Delaware had a vital interest in maintaining
jurisdiction.
Finally, many of the additional Burger King factors are satisfied in this case. For example, evidence relating to the purchase
and installation of the product, the details of the fire, the damage
caused by the fire, and medical testimony regarding treatment of
victims will be present primarily in Delaware. Thus, although the
warranties are unrelated to this plaintiff's cause of action, they
serve the purposes and goals of the specific jurisdiction doctrine,
and thus should justify the exercise of jurisdiction in this case.219
While this Article suggests an expansion of jurisdiction beyond
the strict confines of the specific jurisdiction paradigm as we know
it, the suggested approach will not mark the demise of all restrictions on specific jurisdiction. For example, in Magid v. Marcal
Paper Mills," the plaintiff, a citizen of Pennsylvania, brought
suit in Delaware against his former employer Marcal Paper Mills,
Inc. ("Marcal"), a citizen of New Jersey, for damages resulting
from the termination of his employment in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act." In considering whether the
defendant could be subjected to personal jurisdiction in Delaware,
the court stated that the defendant's only contacts with the forum
were that it "deliver[ed] a very small percentage of its products to
one Delaware wholesaler, and supervis[ed] the sale of its products
in stores in Delaware."' 2 Applying the Delaware hybrid jurisdic:9 It is interesting to note that this case could have been treated as a stream of
commerce case because the defendant placed its product into the stream of commerce
with knowledge that it would be distributed indirectly throughout the United States. If the
court had adopted Justice O'Connor's "stream of commerce plus" analysis, this would
have been a purposeful contact only if the defendant also had other contacts with the forum indicating that it intended to create a relationship with the forum state. Here, the
defendant's warranties to Delaware consumers serve as the necessary additional contact to
persuade a court that the defendant has purposeful contact with the forum.
' 517 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Del. 1981).
221 See id. at 1127.
2 Id. The defendant was not authorized to do business in Delaware, it did not ship
goods to any warehouses or headquarters in Delaware, it did not station any employees in
Delaware or have a telephone listing in Delaware. See id.
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tion long-arm provision, the court held that the alleged breach of a
noncontractual, statutory duty is an allegation of tortious injury.
Additionally, the court held that Marcal had an ongoing relationship with the state due to its regular shipments of products into
Delaware and its ongoing supervision of retail locations. 4 Notwithstanding satisfaction of the long-arm statute, the court in
Magid held that the exercise of jurisdiction over Marcal would
violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.' The court
noted that although the defendant had ongoing, purposeful contacts
with the forum state, the plaintiff's cause of action did not arise
out of the company's sales activity in Delaware? 6 and Delaware
had no palpable interest in adjudicating the dispute.2 7
As noted above, hybrid jurisdiction may be justified in factual
situations where the purposes and goals of specific jurisdiction are
satisfied, even though there is no causal relationship between the
defendant's forum contacts and the plaintiff's cause of action. This
was not the case, however, in Magid. The primary purpose of the
minimum contacts doctrine is to protect the defendant from unfair
exercises of jurisdiction by giving the defendant sufficient notice of
the jurisdictional exposure caused by its forum activities to allow
the defendant an opportunity to foresee the risk of being hailed
into court. In Magid, the defendant had no warehouse or headquarters in Delaware, and it stationed no employees in Delaware.'
Its only contact to the State of Delaware related to the limited
distribution and supervision of the sale of its product in the state.
As a result of these activities, the defendant could have foreseen
being hailed into a Delaware forum for a cause of action relating
to the products it distributed there. It could not reasonably have
foreseen that these contacts would subject it to jurisdiction for a
wrongful termination claim by an employee who resided and
worked for the defendant in Pennsylvania. If jurisdiction were

See id.

" See id.
26.

See id. at 1131.
See id. at 1127-28, 1131 (stating that although the plaintiff's job duties required

him to visit Delaware and supervise some of the Delaware wholesale and retail accounts,
the cause of action arose out of the plaintiff's relationship with the defendant and the decision to discharge the plaintiff which was made in New Jersey).

7 Interestingly, the court noted that the plaintiff chose the Delaware forum because it
was personally convenient to the plaintiff rather than to gain a procedural advantage. See
id. at 1127-28.
. See id. at 1127.
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allowed in this case, the defendant would have been exposed to
jurisdiction by any of its employees in any jurisdiction where the
employee facilitated the distribution or supervision of the sale of
products. This would have been an unreasonable and unfair extension of the defendant's jurisdictional exposure. Thus, although the
defendant could foresee being hailed into a Delaware forum for
some types of claims, the circumstances that gave rise to the
plaintiff's claim were not a foreseeable result of the defendant's
contacts with Delaware.
Moreover, the State of Delaware had no legitimate interest in
adjudicating this dispute. The alleged wrongful conduct occurred in
Pennsylvania to a Pennsylvania resident. Delaware's desire to exercise jurisdiction was only secondary at best. Because the purposes
of specific jurisdiction were not satisfied in this case, a hybrid
theory of jurisdiction would not save an otherwise unconstitutional
exercise of jurisdiction.
V. CONCLUSION

This Article suggests that specific and general personal jurisdiction are two discrete categories of jurisdiction, not merely the
endpoints on a sliding scale. Although many factual scenarios fall
neatly within one of these two jurisdictional categories, there are
scenarios where some of the characteristics of each type of jurisdiction are present, but neither type is independently satisfied. This
Article suggests an analytical framework to determine the constitutionality of exercising jurisdiction in such hybrid cases.
Specific jurisdiction is the most appropriate vehicle to exercise
jurisdiction in hybrid situations. Traditionally, a court considering
the applicability of specific jurisdiction would determine whether
the defendant had purposeful contacts with the forum that gave rise
to (or at least related to) the plaintiff's cause of action. Contacts
that are unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of action would be irrelevant under the traditional specific jurisdiction analysis. This Article
asserts, however, that courts need not automatically exclude consideration of contacts that are not causally related to the plaintiff's
claim, particularly where the defendant has significant contacts with
the forum, as in the hybrid jurisdiction scenario. Rather, as long as
the defendant's contacts with the forum satisfy the purposes and
goals of the specific jurisdiction doctrine, they may be considered
in the jurisdictional equation-regardless of whether they gave rise
to the claim. The Article then determines that the purposes and
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goals of the doctrine are two-fold: (1) to protect the defendant
from unfair exercises of jurisdiction by providing the defendant
with an opportunity to foresee where its conduct will expose it to
jurisdiction, and (2) to provide each state with the power to reach
out beyond its boundaries to adjudicate disputes that legitimately
impact the state.
If these purposes are satisfied, jurisdiction is constitutionally
permissible unless the defendant can show, through application of
the additional considerations listed in Burger King, that the exercise of jurisdiction violates traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. Therefore, although hybrid jurisdiction does not
fit neatly into the present scheme of personal jurisdiction, it is not
necessarily unconstitutional.

